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 Since 2010, advocates on the right and left have increasingly allied to denounce mass 
incarceration and propose serious reductions in the use of prisons. This alliance serves useful 
shared purposes, but each side comes to it with distinct and in many ways incompatible long-term 
interests. If progressive advocates rely solely on this alliance without aggressively building our 
own vision of what decarceration should look like, the unintended consequences could be serious. 
This Article describes the current mass incarceration paradigm and current left-right reform 
efforts. It then outlines how, if progressives do not set clear goals for what should replace mass 
incarceration, these bipartisan efforts risk creating a nightmare scenario of mass control, 
surveillance, and monitoring of Black and Brown communities. Finally, the Article explains why 
this mass control paradigm would lay the groundwork for a heavily-privatized, extraordinarily 
difficult-to-end resurgence of mass incarceration in subsequent decades. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is now widely acknowledged that the United States incarcerates far too many people. 
Though the country has less than 5% of the world’s population, it houses nearly 25% of the 
world’s prisoners.1 And despite fierce partisanship on most issues, major actors across the 
political spectrum agree that something needs to be done about this mass incarceration epidemic. 
Every major civil rights organization involved in criminal justice issues (including the 
ACLU, the NAACP, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, The Leadership Conference for Civil and 
Human Rights, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and others) and major 
progressive-aligned think tanks like the Sentencing Project, the Center for American Progress and 
the Brennan Center for Justice have called for an end to mass incarceration. 
On the right, think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, the American Conservative Union 
and conservative thought leaders like Newt Gingrich, Grover Norquist, and Pat Nolan have all 
called for criminal justice reform. Prominent former elected officials like Rick Perry, Jeb Bush, 
and Ken Cuccinelli have joined in this call. Even the Koch brothers—perhaps the most infamous 
financial supporters of ultraconservative causes—are now publicly supporting and funding efforts 
at criminal justice reform. 
In the early stages of the 2016 presidential race, both the Oval Office and its aspirants—
from both parties—expressed support for decarceration that would have been unimaginable just a 
few years ago. In a landmark 2015 speech, President Barack Obama declared, “Mass 
incarceration makes our country worse off, and we need to do something about it,” and conducted 
the first-ever visit by a sitting president to a federal prison.2 Early in the primaries for the 2016
                                                                  
1  Sari Horwitz, Holder seeks to avert mandatory minimum sentences for some low-level drug offenders,
WASH. POST, (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/holder-seeks-to-avert-
mandatory-minimum-sentences-for-some-low-level-drug-offenders/2013/08/11/343850c2-012c-11e3-96a8-
d3b921c0924a_story.html [https://perma.cc/2DWY-S72M]. 
2  White House, Remarks by the President at the NAACP Conference (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks-president-naacp-conference [https://perma.cc/CH5P-
ANSK]; Peter Baker, Obama, in Oklahoma, Takes Reform Message to the Prison Cell Block, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1K8ZqX0 [https://perma.cc/V93M-NNN6].
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol20/iss2/3
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presidential race, both Democratic and Republican candidates issued similar calls for criminal 
justice reforms.3
The left and the right, however, each come to this alliance with distinct and, ultimately, 
incompatible interests. Recently, the progressive advocacy community has begun to seriously 
grapple with the limits of the left-right alliance. This includes differences over whether and how 
to address policing practices and racial disparities in prosecutions, suspicions that conservatives 
are using decarceration as a Trojan Horse to protect white-collar criminals, and disagreement 
about whether decarceration should be accompanied by increased societal investment in housing, 
employment opportunities, health care, and other social services.4
Separately, progressive advocates are also examining the negative implications of the 
general trend toward greater criminal justice privatization.5 However, there has so far been little 
effort to connect the dots between the two.6 Unifying these two lines of thinking illustrates why 
                                                                  
3  Peter Baker, 2016 Candidates Are United in Call to Alter Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015), 
http://nyti.ms/1DERGad [https://perma.cc/U42S-WEBC]. Notably, this did not include Donald Trump. Id. Trump said 
relatively little about criminal justice reform on the campaign trail, but his few statements on the issue were negative. See
Eric Levitz, Donald Trump Warns NRA That ‘Heartless Hillary’ Will Take Their Guns, Free All Violent Criminals, N.Y.
MAG. (May 20, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/05/trump-to-nra-clinton-will-free-all-criminals.html 
[https://perma.cc/8XW9-ND6F].  
4 See discussion infra Section II.D.2. See also David Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1473, 1507 (2014) (arguing that related efforts to establish criminal “problem-solving courts” are “eerily 
reminiscent” of earlier bipartisan coalition to establish federal sentencing guidelines, and that each side “must resolve . . .
whether their objectives are, in fact, incompatible, and whether cognitive bias may be distorting their expectations of what 
problem-solving courts will ultimately achieve”). 
5 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-FUNDED”
PROBATION INDUSTRY (2014) [hereinafter PROFITING FROM PROBATION] (describing growth of privatized probation in 
Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi); Complaint, Reynolds v. Judicial Correction Services, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00161-MHT-
CSC (M.D. Ala. Mar.12, 2015) (lawsuit filed by SPLC alleging that private probation company is operating as a 
racketeering enterprise extorting money from poor defendants); Complaint, Thompson v. DeKalb County, No. (N.D. Ga. 
Jan. 29, 2015) (lawsuit filed by ACLU alleging that county officials and private probation company are unlawfully 
denying probationers the right to counsel and to an indigency hearing before sentencing them to jail); Brave New Films, 
To Prison for Poverty, Brave New Films, http://www.bravenewfilms.org/toprisonforpoverty [https:// 
perma.cc/6U2R-V9AS]; Brave New Films, To Prison for Poverty Part 1, YOUTUBE (June 4, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C_cIWv9yc3A [https://perma.cc/YQ8G-F45H]. 
6  Caroline Isaacs of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) has done valuable work by 
describing how private prison companies are expanding from merely warehousing people into a “treatment industrial 
complex” that allows them to profit from providing treatment-oriented programs and services. She argues that the profit 
motive will lead to a “net-widening” effect that will increase the number of people ordered to remain under supervision by 
these companies. However, Isaacs does not examine how the profit motive would shift as mass supervision becomes 
established and mass incarceration declines—a key element of my Article. See CAROLINE ISAACS, TREATMENT
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS ARE UNDERMINING EFFORTS TO TREAT AND REHABILITATE
PRISONERS FOR CORPORATE GAIN, AFSC ARIZONA, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP & SOUTHERN CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
(2014), https://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/TIC_report_online.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV2K-
JNRT]; CAROLINE ISAACS, COMMUNITY CAGES: PROFITIZING COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES TO 
INCARCERATION, AFSC ARIZONA (2016), https://afscarizona.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/communitycages.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BCJ-7QMA]. David Dagan and Steven Teles cover similar ground by discussing the differing positions 
of liberal and conservative decarceration advocates, including the general support of conservatives for criminal justice 
privatization. However, Dagan and Teles conclude that both liberal and conservative reformers will need to accept, in 
place of mass incarceration, a supervisory carceral state characterized by paternalistic government action. See David 
Dagan & Steven M. Teles, Locked In? Conservative Reform and the Future of Mass Incarceration, 651 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 266, 271 (2014). Hadar Aviram has explained how the privatization of services within public 
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relying solely on the bipartisan alliance to decide what comes after decarceration is a dangerous 
choice. If the United States follows a fiscally conservative plan for decarceration that relies on 
increased privatization, the unintended consequences could be serious. Accordingly, although 
progressive advocates should continue working to find common ground with conservatives, we 
should be working equally as hard to promote our distinct vision of what kind of societal 
structures (including both the criminal justice system and other forms of public spending) should 
replace mass incarceration. 
Parts I and II of this Article provide context by describing the current mass incarceration 
paradigm, including the privatization of criminal justice functions and the “user-funded” criminal 
justice system, as well as describing the current left-right reform efforts. Part III argues that if 
progressives do not set clear goals for what should replace mass incarceration, these left-right 
reform efforts risk creating a nightmare scenario of mass control, surveillance, and monitoring of 
Black and Brown communities. Finally, it argues that this mass control paradigm would lay the 
groundwork for a heavily-privatized, extraordinarily difficult-to-end resurgence of mass 
incarceration in subsequent decades. 
I. MASS INCARCERATION AND THE CARCERAL STATE 
In this article, I use Marie Gottschalk’s term “carceral state” to refer to the full range of 
penal punishments and controls, from secure confinement in prisons and jails to various forms of 
supervision and governmental control.7 I reserve the narrower term “mass incarceration” for the 
use of secure confinement. Although mass incarceration is the most visible and inhumane 
component of the carceral state, it is part of a larger system, and—for the reasons explained in 
Part III below—criminal justice reform efforts that focus only on the mass incarceration 
component of the carceral state are unlikely to actually end either the carceral state or mass 
incarceration in the long term. This section provides context for Parts II and III by describing the 
origins and contours of our present carceral state. It begins with the origins of mass incarceration, 
describes the major elements of the carceral state, and then describes the related trends of 
privatization and the “user-funded” criminal justice system. 
A. Birth of a Carceral Nation 
From 1925 (when the Bureau of Justice Statistics first began collecting nationwide data) 
to 1972, the U.S. per-capita incarceration rate remained relatively stable, with prison and jail 
populations rising in tandem with the overall population.8 But starting in 1972, the United States 
                                                                  
prisons, as well as the neoliberal economy in which both operate, have the effect of narrowing the distinction between 
these prisons and their privately-operated counterparts. However, Aviram does not examine how incarceration interacts 
with supervision, and her policy prescription is merely to change the compensation model for prisons. See Hadar Aviram, 
Are Private Prisons to Blame for Mass Incarceration and its Evils? Prison Conditions, Neoliberalism, and Public Choice,
42 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 411, 434-38, 448-49 (2014). Additionally, Sharon Dolovich has examined private prisons 
(though not other forms of criminal justice privatization) through a liberal legitimacy framework. See Sharon Dolovich, 
State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437 (2005). 
7 See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1-
2 (2015).
8  JEREMY TRAVIS, BRUCE WESTERN & STEVE REDBURN, EDS., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L
ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 34 (2014), http://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/nrc/NAS_report_on_incarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5N2-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol20/iss2/3
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embarked on an historically unprecedented prison boom that grew unabated for nearly three 
decades. By the time the U.S. incarceration rate stabilized in 2009, the United States was 
incarcerating people at more than four times its historical incarceration rate and seven times the 
rate of Western European democracies.9 In absolute numbers, this meant that the United States 
maintained a total of 2.29 million people in custody in 2009—seven times more people than the 
United States incarcerated in 1972.10 As President Barack Obama stated in a July 2015 speech, 
“For what we spend to keep everyone locked up for one year, we could eliminate tuition at every 
single one of our public colleges and universities.”11
Since 2009, there has been some progress in reducing the incarcerated population. By 
2015, the combined prison and jail population had fallen about 5% from its 2009 peak.12
However, contrary to popular belief, this modest reduction in the national incarceration rate is not 
the result of a uniform, nationwide decarceration trend. Instead, it is attributable to specific policy 
changes that reduced prison populations in a handful of states—primarily California, New York, 
and New Jersey.13 Meanwhile, the national jail population has changed relatively little since 
2011.14 Additionally, the immigration detention population—though a relatively small part of the 
overall incarcerated population—consistently exceeded 30,000 from 2007 to 2014.15 In other 
words, claims that mass incarceration is clearly or inevitably on its way out have been greatly 
exaggerated.16
This incarceration boom coincided with a similarly stunning increase in the number of 
people under criminal justice supervision, such as probation and parole. From 1976 to 2010, the 
probation population grew from 923,000 to 4.06 million.17 Similarly, from 1975 (the earliest date 
for which data are available) to 2010, the parole population grew from 143,000 to 841,000.18
                                                                  
PRRH] [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
9 Id. at 34-37. See also TODD D. MINTON AND ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES IN 2015, NCJ 250394 2, tbl. 1 (June 2015) [hereinafter JAIL INMATES IN 2015] (jail population 
peaked in 2008, at more than three-quarters of a million people); E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2015, NCJ 250229 2, tbl. 1 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter PRISONERS IN 2015] (prison 
population peaked in 2009, at more than 1.6 million people). 
10  NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 35-37. 
11  Remarks by the President at the NAACP Conference, The White House Briefing Room (July 14, 2015 
4:54 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks-president-naacp-conference
[https://perma.cc/8GK2-KHV8].
12 See PRISONERS IN 2015, supra note 9, at 2, tbl. 1 (prison population); JAIL INMATES IN 2015, supra note
9, at 2, tbl. 1 (jail population). The combined prison and jail population fell from 2,382,887 in 2009 to 2,254,992 in 2015. 
13  PETER WAGNER, TRACKING STATE PRISON GROWTH IN 50 STATES, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (May 28, 
2014), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/overtime.html [https://perma.cc/PBR3-G2US]. 
14 See JAIL INMATES IN 2015, supra note 9, at 2, tbl. 1.
15  ICE, WEEKLY DEPARTURES AND DETENTION REPORT, 9 (June 20, 2016).  The population briefly 
dropped below 30,000 in 2015, but rose significantly above 30,000 in 2016. Id.; CARL TAKEI, MICHAEL TAN & JOANNE
LIN, ACLU, SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS 8 (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_ 
document/white_paper_09-30-16_released_for_web-v1-opt.pdf [https://perma.cc/K28R-KGTC] (“In recent months, the 
average daily detention population has grown to record levels, hitting nearly 37,000 people in June 2016”). 
16 See, e.g., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE PRISON POPULATION FORECASTER // STATE PRISON POPULATION
(Aug. 2015) http://webapp.urban.org/reducing-mass-incarceration/ [https://perma.cc/K5T2-JBKL] (“If the 15 states in our 
forecaster make no policy changes and current trends hold constant, the prison population in those states is forecasted to 
decline only 2 percent by the end of 2021”). 
17  NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 40. 
18 Id. at 41. 
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Thus, by 2010, nearly 5 million people were on probation and parole.19 Because violations of 
terms of supervision often return people to prison and jail, the growth in probation and parole 
supervision helped further feed the incarceration boom. As the National Academy of Sciences 
reported in its comprehensive 2014 study of mass incarceration, parole violations accounted for 
an increasing share of state prison admissions as mass incarceration became more entrenched—
rising from 20% in 1980 to 30% in 1991 and then between 30 and 40% in 2010.20
B. Why Did Mass Incarceration Happen? 
As mass incarceration continued to metastasize from the 1970s to the 2000s, many 
people assumed that rising rates of incarceration were a result of increases in crime, and that if 
crime rates fell, so would prison populations.21 However, that turned out not to be the case. While 
both crime and incarceration rates did rise significantly from the early 1960s to the 1980s, violent 
crime fell in the 1990s even as the incarceration rate continued to rise, and crime rates stabilized 
at a relatively low level in the 2000s as incarceration rates hit their peak.22 For this reason, the 
National Academy of Sciences flatly stated in 2014 that “the very high rates of incarceration that 
emerged over the past decades cannot simply be ascribed to a higher level of crime today 
compared with the early 1970s, when the prison boom began.”23
So, what actually caused mass incarceration? The consensus explanation points to 
changes in law enforcement priorities and sentencing policy that resulted in state and federal 
authorities putting more people in prison for more reasons and for longer periods of time than at 
any prior time in U.S. history.24 Throughout this period, rising incarceration rates were unrelated 
to trends in crime, and social science evidence had “strikingly little influence on deliberations 
about sentencing policy.”25 Instead, these changes in policy and practice were largely a response 
to racist fear mongering (exemplified by the Willie Horton ad26 in the 1980s and overblown fears 
of juvenile “superpredators” in the 1990s stoked by John DiIulio27) and the perceived urgency of 
                                                                  
19 Id. at 42. 
20 Id. at 41. 
21 See, e.g., James Dao, Pataki Proposes Legislative Plan to Curb Violent Crime by Youths, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 10, 1995) (discussing New York Governor Pataki’s plan to fund additional prison construction in response to youth 
crime); Josh Barbanel, Koch Recommends Stiffer Penalties and More Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 1985) (reporting New 
York Mayor Koch’s statement that if forced to choose between improving city schools and expanding prisons, he would 
expand prisons because only stiff sentences can deter crime).
22  NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 46-47. 
23 Id. at 47.
24 Id. at 48-49 (drug law enforcement efforts); 50-51 (increased likelihood that arrest would lead to prison 
sentences); 68-69 (“Increased admission rates are closely associated with increased incarceration for drug crimes and 
explain much of the growth of incarceration in the 1980s, while increased time served is closely associated with 
incarceration for violent crimes and explains much of the growth since the 1980s. These trends are, in turn, attributable 
largely to changes in sentencing policy over the period.”) 70-78 (describing first phase of shift from indeterminate to 
determinate sentencing, aimed at increasing consistency and driven by notions of fairness), 78-85 (describing second 
phase of shift, aimed at increasing certainty and severity of sentences).
25 Id. at 69 (concluding lack of relationship between crime and incarceration trends), 89 (discussing lack of 
influence of social science evidence).
26 See Beth Schwartzapfel & Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 13, 2015, 
6:37 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-horton-revisited [https://perma.cc/Z8KT-5PCJ]. 
27 See John J. DiIulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY JOURNAL (Spring 1996). See also 
Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES: RETRO REPORT (April 6, 2014), 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol20/iss2/3
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the War on Drugs. At both state and federal levels, legislators responded by approving 
increasingly harsh sentencing laws, including mandatory minimum sentences, “Truth in 
Sentencing,” Three Strikes laws, and stiff sentencing guidelines. The same dynamics led 
legislators to ramp up the size and aggressiveness of the police presence in cities—particularly in 
Black and Brown neighborhoods.28 Both liberals and conservatives supported many of these 
changes—including the shift from indeterminate sentencing to the use of sentencing guidelines, 
which liberals incorrectly believed would reduce racial disparities and biases in sentencing.29
One highly influential theoretical framework for explaining and critiquing mass 
incarceration is Michelle Alexander’s 2010 book, The New Jim Crow, positing that the War on 
Drugs converted the criminal justice system into a new form of racialized social control.30 Under 
this framework, the carceral state functions as a “racial caste system . . . . a set of structural 
arrangements that locks a racially distinct group into a subordinate political, social, and economic 
position, effectively creating a second-class citizenship.”31 In Alexander’s framework, the 
criminal justice system “is no longer concerned primarily with the prevention and punishment of 
crime, but rather with the management and control of the dispossessed.”32
                                                                  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html
[https://perma.cc/V7FH-EHGD].
28 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 8, at 50, 61; Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64
HASTINGS L.J. 423, 428-430 (2013) (suggesting that the war on drugs vastly expanded prosecutions and harsh sentencing, 
which led to mass incarceration); Heather Schoenfeld, The War on Drugs, The Politics of Crime, and Mass Incarceration 
in the United States, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 315, 327-44 (2012) (using Florida as a case study of how state policy 
changes led to mass incarceration); see generally David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 27 (2011). 
There is a near-universal consensus that these changes in sentencing policy and policing practices are the main causes of 
mass incarceration. However, John Pfaff recently received public attention by pushing a contrarian explanation that 
emphasizes prosecutorial aggressiveness rather than sentencing laws (oddly, without seriously exploring how sentencing 
laws might have contributed to this prosecutorial aggressiveness). See John F. Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison 
Growth: Limited Importance, Limited Legislative Options, 52 HARVARD J. ON LEGIS. 173, 175-76 (2015); David Brooks, 
Opinion, The Prison Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/opinion/david-brooks-
the-prison-problem.html [https://perma.cc/7828-MAV7] (praising Pfaff). Pfaff argues that the War on Drugs had only a 
limited impact on prison growth because sentences for drug offenses account for only one-fifth of the growth in prison 
populations since 1980, and claims that the chief cause of mass incarceration is a mysterious, unexplained increase in the 
aggressiveness of prosecutors. Pfaff, supra at 182, 198-99. However, Pfaff inappropriately ignores the ripple effects that 
the War on Drugs had on the entire criminal justice system, including harsher non-drug sentencing statutes and greater 
powers for police. These changes massively increased the power and leverage of prosecutors in both drug and non-drug 
cases, which is why Doug Berman has characterized the Pfaff/Brooks account as “too simplistic and incomplete.” See
Doug Berman, Is the “don’t blame the drug war for mass incarceration” counter-narrative problematically incomplete?,
SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (Sept. 29, 2015), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/09/is-
the-dont-blame-the-drug-war-for-mass-incarceration-counter-narrative-problematically-incomplete.html
[https://perma.cc/694Z-2DQW]. 
29  NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014) (arguing 
that liberal law-and-order ideologies of this kind entrenched notions of Black criminality, fueled carceral state-building, 
and fortified the legitimacy of the carceral state); Jaros, supra note 4, at 1490-97 (arguing that cognitive biases may have 
lulled liberals into false solidarity with conservatives). 
30 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010). 
31 Id. at 179-80. 
32 Id. at 183. 
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Despite its explanatory power, however, Alexander’s framework is a flawed roadmap for 
reform. For example, James Forman argues that Alexander’s focus on the War on Drugs diverts 
attention from the role that excessive punishment for violent offenses plays in mass incarceration, 
that the use of the Jim Crow analogy obscures class distinctions among Blacks, and that the 
analogy may not help to mobilize other racial groups that have also been harmed by mass 
incarceration.33 Additionally, Marie Gottschalk argues that “[t]ethering a penal reform agenda too 
tightly to the goal of reducing racial disparities in incarceration could have a perverse result—
smaller disparities but not necessarily more racial or social justice.”34 Gottschalk points out that 
reducing the number of people in prison for low-level offenses can paradoxically lead to greater, 
not lesser, racial disparities in their prison populations. Minnesota, for example, has both an 
incarceration rate well below the national average and an 11:1 Black-white imprisonment ratio—
significantly worse than the rest of the country.35 Thus, Gottschalk warns that the New Jim Crow 
framework fails to address how complex it will be to dismantle the carceral state in a way that 
serves the ends of racial justice: focusing exclusively on shrinking the carceral state may actually 
worsen its racial disparities, and focusing exclusively on its racial disparities may not reduce the 
size or abusiveness of the carceral state.36
C. The Modern Carceral State 
Mass incarceration is just one component of the modern carceral state, which is 
composed not only of federal and state prisons and local jails, but also federal and state 
community corrections facilities, federal and state forms of supervision like probation and parole, 
and the federal immigration detention system. 
1. Mass Incarceration in Prisons and Jails 
In 2015 (the most recent figures available), there were about 1.53 million people in state 
and federal prisons and 728,000 people in local jails throughout the United States.37
Prisons hold people who have already been convicted of a crime and who are serving 
longer sentences (typically, exceeding one year). Most people in prison (about 1.33 million) are in 
the custody of state governments for violations of state laws, while a significant minority 
(196,000 as of 2015) are in federal custody for violations of federal law.38 Prisons are the primary 
focus of most efforts at decarceration, both because the absolute number of people in prison are 
larger than the number of people in jail and because prisons are operated by the state and federal 
governments rather than local jurisdictions—which makes it easier to reduce prison populations 
through a combination of changes to state and federal criminal statutes and changes to the policies 
of state executive agencies and the federal government. 
In contrast, the 728,000 people incarcerated in local jails are scattered across some 2,850 
jurisdictions nationwide.39 These jurisdictions are typically city or county entities, run by locally-
                                                                  
33  James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 21, 45-49, 64 (2012). 
34  GOTTSCHALK, supra note 7, at 133. 
35 Id. at 132-34.
36 Id. at 133. 
37  PRISONERS IN 2015, supra note 9, at 2, tbl. 1; JAIL INMATES IN 2015, supra note 9, at 2, tbl. 1. 
38  PRISONERS IN 2015, supra note 9, at 5, tbl. 2. 
39  JAIL INMATES IN 2015, supra note 9, at 10. 
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elected officials—most often sheriffs. Nationwide, more than 60% of the people in jail are being 
detained pretrial and have not actually been convicted of a crime; the remainder are typically 
serving sentences too short to justify transfer to a prison—usually one year or less.40 This 
represents a mass sorting of rich defendants from poor defendants, as the vast majority of those 
detained pretrial are held simply because they cannot afford to pay bail.41 Those who cannot make 
bail feel increased pressure to plead guilty because each successive day in jail means lost liberty, 
lost income, and separation from family.42 Continued pretrial detention may also mean denial of 
necessary medical care or even death.43
Pretrial detention has also been linked to worse case outcomes. The New York City 
Criminal Justice Agency found that in nonfelony cases, defendants who were released pending 
disposition had a 50 percent conviction rate, but detained defendants had a 92 percent conviction 
rate.44 Similarly, a recent study funded by the Arnold Foundation found that defendants held 
during their entire pretrial period were significantly more likely to be sentenced to jail or prison 
upon conviction, with longer sentences than their non-detained counterparts.45
Given the widespread lack of community mental health and drug treatment resources, 
jails often serve as the de facto first-line institutions for people in need of mental health and drug 
addiction treatment.46 Jails are also where people targeted by aggressive policing policies are most 
                                                                  
40 Id. at 5, tbl. 4. 
41  Timothy R. Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial Practitioners and a 
Framework for American Pretrial Reform, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR. 24-25 (Aug. 2014), 
http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Fundamentals%20of%20Bail%20-%20NIC%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
63CJ-8A4F] (estimating that approximately 90% of felony defendants detained pretrial are detained simply due to lack of 
money to pay bail). 
42  Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/PRG9-FSTC] (“By encouraging poor defendants to plead guilty, 
bail keeps the system afloat.”); The Price of Freedom: Bail and Pretrial Detention of Low Income Nonfelony  
Defendants in New York City, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 31-32 (Dec. 2, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/sites/ 
default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L9M-85RP] (“Judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel 
all know that defendants at arraignments who face the prospect of pretrial detention because they cannot post bail are 
likely to agree to plea bargains.”). 
43 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 30-33, 39, Hernandez v. County of 
Monterey, No. 5:13-cv-2354-PSG (N.D. Cal 2015), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/JC-CA-0107-0008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T8CU-PMGX] (granting preliminary injunction regarding unconstitutional medical care, suicide risks, 
and barriers to disability access); Cruel and Unusual Punishment: How a Savage Gang of Deputies Controls LA County 
Jails, ACLU & ACLU OF S. CALIF. 1, 4 (Sept. 2011), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/78162_aclu_
jails_r2_lr.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM9J-R96Z] (describing jail’s culture of deputy-on-prisoner violence); Mitch Smith, 
Sandra Bland’s Mother Files Wrongful-Death Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/05/ 
us/sandra-bland-family-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/5FU3-NUBK] (describing death of Black motorist in a Texas jail).
44  Mary T. Phillips, Pretrial Detention and Case Outcomes, Part 1: Nonfelony Cases, NEW YORK CITY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC. 56 (Nov. 2007); Mary T. Phillips, Bail, Detention, & Nonfelony Case Outcomes, NEW
YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC. 1, 5-6 (May 2007). This relationship between detention and conviction 
continued to remain significant even after controlling for the number and severity of arrest charges, the offense type of the 
arraignment charge, the defendant’s criminal history, demographic characteristics, borough, and length of case processing, 
and other factors. Id. at 6. 
45 Pretrial Criminal Justice Research, LAURA AND JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. 3 (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-Pretrial-CJ-Research-brief_FNL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QLF-RSMQ]. 
46 See Ram Subramanian et al., Incarceration’s Front Door: The Misuse of Jails in America, VERA
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 11-12 (Feb. 2015), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/incarcerations-
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likely to be incarcerated. “Broken Windows” policing strategies—which target minor public order 
offenses such as vandalism, panhandling, and public drinking47—are a prime example. The chief 
impact of such strategies is to create a steady number of arrests of poor people of color.48
Additionally, aggressive efforts to collect criminal justice fines and fees create another source of 
unnecessary arrests. These arrests result in jail stays.49  Unnecessary jailing of people arrested for 
minor offenses can also cut them off from jobs, family, and other financial and social supports—
making them more likely to commit crimes than if they had remained connected to these sources 
of stability. A recent study found that for people identified as low risk for pretrial misconduct, 
spending as little as two to three days in jail after being charged was associated with significantly 
increased chances they would commit new crimes within the next two years compared to similar 
people who had been released within 24 hours.50
2. Community Corrections Facilities and Supervision 
The reach of the carceral state extends far beyond prisons and jails. On any given day, 
there are an unknown number of people in residential community corrections facilities and nearly 
4.7 million people on some form of community supervision, such as probation or parole.51
a. Community Corrections Facilities 
There is no concise, generally agreed-upon definition of a community corrections 
facility. Generally speaking, they are residential facilities in or near population centers where 
prisoners are assigned either to serve a sentence in lieu of prison or to serve the final portions of 
their sentence.52 In the federal system, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has broad discretion 
                                                                  
front-door-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2QR-ZFF9]. 
47  George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The police and neighborhood safety, THE
ATLANTIC (March 1982).
48  K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-
Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 281, 307 (2009) (“[T]he arrests resulting from ZTP are in 
the hundreds of thousands, are for particularly minor offenses, disproportionately affect people of color, and do not result 
in more seizures of weapons.”). The consequences of Broken Windows policing can also be deadly. Al Baker et al.,
Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/D3Y5-RSB5]. 
49 See discussion infra Section I.C.2.d. (discussing criminal justice debt as path to incarceration). See also, 
e.g., In for a Penny: The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ Prisons, ACLU (Oct. 2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ 
InForAPenny_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7EK-2YLC] [hereinafter ACLU, In for a Penny]; Criminal Justice Debt: A 
Barrier to Reentry, BRENNAN CENTER 8, 32 (Oct. 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3RWC-YZTF]; Investigation of the Ferguson Police 
Department, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 52-58 (March 4, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/435Z-
GHHS].
50 Pretrial Criminal Justice Research, supra note 45, at 1, 5. 
51 See Danielle Kaeble & Thomas P. Bonczar, NCJ 250230, Probation and Parole in the United States, 
2015, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1 (2016) (community supervision statistics at year-end 2015). 
52 See Ray Knapp & Peggy Burke, Residential Community Corrections Facilities: Current Practice and 
Policy Issues, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS 5-7 (Aug. 1992), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/ 
010938.pdf [https://perma.cc/94RE-3FVN]. 
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to decide whether to place a person in a secure prison or community corrections facility, 
regardless of what the sentencing court recommends.53
Nobody knows how many community corrections facilities exist in the United States. 
However, within the federal system, about 10,000 people are in BOP-contracted residential 
reentry centers on any given day, which represents about five percent of the BOP’s custody 
population.54 So a rough, back-of-the-envelope estimate would suggest there may be somewhere 
in the neighborhood of 50,000 to 100,000 people in similar facilities under the jurisdiction of state 
correctional authorities.55
Unlike prisons, community corrections facilities are usually not directly operated by the 
government. Instead, they are operated by nongovernmental entities—sometimes non-profit, 
sometimes for-profit—that contract with correctional agencies. 
In theory, community corrections facilities are supposed to provide enhanced services 
and education in a residential, community-based setting. In practice, however, they can become 
dysfunctional, dangerous places that fail to provide the promised services, allow violence and 
rape inside their doors to go unchecked, or both, and ultimately fail to ease the difficult transition 
from prison to the community.56 A recent Rutgers University study concluded that “very little is 
known about the effectiveness” of halfway houses and that “[r]esearch has not yet suggested an 
evidence-based residential reentry model for handling the complex problems of special needs 
groups on the path to reintegration.”57 Indeed, one recent study of community corrections centers 
in Pennsylvania found that spending time in such a facility was “a significant predictor of 
recidivism,” and that the control group (i.e., people who were simply put on parole supervision 
after release from prison) generally had better outcomes.58 Similarly, a recent study of BOP 
halfway houses concluded that participation in halfway house programs “does not have a more 
positive influence on offender outcomes,” and that increasing the length of time a person spends 
in a halfway house has no relationship with positive outcomes.59
                                                                  
53 See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). 
54 Population Statistics, BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/86VV-PR4L] (last visited Dec. 21, 2016) (indicating 9,269 people in Residential Reentry Centers). 
55 See PRISONERS IN 2015, supra note 9, at 3, tbl. 1 (listing number of prisoners under jurisdiction of 
federal and state correctional authorities). This is a very rough estimate because it does not account for varying state 
policies and practices. 
56 See, e.g., Justin Moyer, To some, D.C. halfway house is more like ‘Hopeless Village,’ WASH. POST (Aug. 
29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2013/08/29/cd282a86-f4c1-11e2-9434-60440856fadf_story.html 
[http://perma.cc/4F2P-8JJQ]; Sam Dolnick, At a Halfway House, Bedlam Reigns, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2012), 
http://nyti.ms/1wU5IBH [https://perma.cc/B8FS-YYS4]; Sam Dolnick, As Escapees Stream Out, a Penal Business 
Thrives, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2012), http://nyti.ms/1C0iW5A [http://perma.cc/G6ZJ-N8AG]. 
57  RUTGERS UNIVERSITY CTR. FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES & CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH,
HALFWAY FROM PRISON TO THE COMMUNITY: FROM CURRENT PRACTICE TO BEST PRACTICE 8, 2 (2013),
https://cafwd.app.box.com/s/oit9lo07b72124qjjcik [http://perma.cc/CJC2-PJLQ] [hereinafter HALFWAY FROM PRISON].
58  EDWARD J. LATESSA, CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, & KRISTIN BECHTEL, CTR. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESEARCH, UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, COMMUNITY CORRECTION CENTERS, PAROLEES, AND RECIDIVISM: AN INVESTIGATION
INTO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE REENTRY PROGRAMS IN PA., FINAL REPORT 4-6, 173, (May 2009), 
https://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/ccjr/docs/reports/project_reports/PA_ReentryFinal_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/7Z3D-
BY8P].
59  JENNIFER LERCH, FAYE S. TAXMAN, & AMY MERICLE, ADVANCING CORRECTIONAL EXCELLENCE!,
GEORGE MASON UNIV., WHAT WORKS IN RESIDENTIAL REENTRY CENTERS - REPORT 6: TECHNICAL VIOLATION RATES
AND REARREST RATES ON FEDERAL PROBATION AFTER RELEASE FROM AN RRC  9 (Dec. 2010), 
https://www.gmuace.org/documents/publications/2010/Monograph%206.pdf [http://perma.cc/XU8L-3W5D].
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Various best practices for community corrections facilities have been proposed, but those 
best practices also include the caveat that research on these facilities “is in its infancy.”60
Additionally, there is little uniformity in how government contracts with such facilities are 
structured.61
b. Supervision
Supervision can be imposed at three different stages of the criminal justice process: 
pretrial supervision for people released pending trial, a sentence of probation imposed in lieu of 
some or all of a prison or jail term, and parole supervision following release from prison or jail. 
Pretrial supervision is often the fate of the people “lucky” enough to avoid pretrial 
detention. In years past, people who successfully paid bail pending trial or who were released 
without bail were generally not subject to supervision. Now, however, the combination of an 
ever-expanding carceral state and new technologies that make mass pretrial supervision possible 
have made it more attractive for jurisdictions to expand pretrial supervision to people who might 
otherwise have simply been released pending trial. Electronic monitoring—chiefly tracking 
people with GPS monitors—has become especially common. Between 2005 and 2015, the 
number of people in the criminal justice system subjected to electronic monitoring grew by nearly 
140 percent.62
Since the mid-twentieth century, probation supervision has operated as a formalized 
function of the courts.63 A probation officer’s role is not limited to merely carrying out court-
ordered supervision; they typically also conduct factual investigations and prepare reports that 
guide the judge’s decisions of whether to release a defendant pending trial, whether to permit a 
defendant to receive probation instead of a prison sentence, and what conditions to impose on 
both pretrial release and post-sentence probation.64
Probation generally involves severe limitations on a supervisee’s Fourth Amendment 
rights; the U.S. Supreme Court has held that probation conditions may authorize warrantless 
searches of a supervisee’s home and person without probable cause, and any law enforcement 
officer (not just probation officers) may freely take advantage of this warrantless search 
                                                                  
60  HALFWAY FROM PRISON, supra note 57, at 14-15. 
61 See id. at 10-13. 
62  PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, USE OF ELECTRONIC OFFENDER-TRACKING DEVICES EXPANDS SHARPLY 1 
(Sept.2016),http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/10/use_of_electronic_offender_tracking_devices_expands_sha
rply.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC7L-3WRG]. See Molly Carney, Note, Correction through Omniscience: Electronic 
Monitoring and the Escalation of Crime Control, 40 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 279, 294 (2012) (contending that electronic 
monitoring brings new populations under criminal justice supervision, not just those that would otherwise be 
incarcerated); Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1367-68 (2008) (arguing that “the economics of 
technological control enable the regulation of greater numbers of persons under less stringent conditions for a longer 
period of time and to a greater degree than an equivalent physical intrusion.”). But see Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial
Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1378-80 (2014) (conceding that availability of electronic 
monitoring would likely lead to increased use of monitoring on defendants who would otherwise have been released on 
bail or personal recognizance, but contending that “the liberty and privacy costs [to these individuals] must be weighed 
against the benefits to those who would otherwise not be released”). 
63  Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 149, 155 (1997) (describing 
nineteenth-century origins of probation in an informal arrangement between a judge, a bootmaker, and an alcoholic, and 
describing its later formalization and professionalization). 
64 Id. at 159-61. 
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authority.65 Additionally, a sentence of probation typically involves numerous behavioral 
requirements. Within the federal system, for example, all probation supervisees must submit to 
periodic drug tests regardless of whether or not their crime was drug-related, and standard 
conditions of probation include not traveling outside a specific geographic area, avoiding places 
where drugs are illegally sold or used, avoiding associating with “any persons engaged in criminal 
activity,” avoiding associating with anyone else with a felony record without the probation 
officer’s permission, and permitting the probation officer to “visit the defendant at any time at 
home or elsewhere” to observe and seize “contraband.”66 Other jurisdictions impose similar 
restrictions as a matter of course, and courts are free to pile on additional conditions with little 
substantive appellate review.67 When a person violates any of these conditions, his or her 
probation officer has discretion to decide whether to bring the violation to the court’s attention 
and, if so, what sanctions to recommend to the court.68 Most commonly, a sentence of probation is 
paired with a suspended prison sentence for the original offense; this enables the judge (at the 
request of the probation officer) to respond to a violation by continuing or extending probation, 
modifying the terms of probation, or revoking probation and immediately imposing the original 
suspended prison sentence.69 Additionally, some jurisdictions are experimenting with “flash 
incarceration” programs that empower probation officers to order limited periods in jail without a 
judicial hearing.70
                                                                  
65 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2001) (warrantless police search of probation 
supervisee’s home supported by less than probable cause was constitutional, even though it had no relationship to his 
probation officer’s efforts to monitor probation compliance); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876-88 (1987) 
(approving warrantless searches of probation supervisees without probable cause). Although the U.S. Supreme Court has 
not directly addressed whether a probation supervisee may be searched without any individualized suspicion at all, a 
number of circuit courts of appeal have answered this question in the affirmative. See, e.g., United States v. King, 736 
F.3d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding probation supervision condition imposing suspicionless, warrantless searches); 
United States v. Monteiro, 270 F.3d 465, 470-71 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 837 (6th 
Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Sharp, 931 F.2d 1310, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 
1366 (11th Cir. 1982) (same).
66 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3(a)(5) (drug testing), § 
5B1.3(c) (other standard conditions) (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-
manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf [http://perma.cc/6GCM-PADH] [hereinafter 2015 SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL].
67 See Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1015, 1032-36 (2013) (conditions can range from general admonitions to bizarrely specific and problematic commands); 
See generally Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some Proposals for Curbing 
Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75 (2000) (describing extremely broad range of 
conditions that have survived appellate review, including commanding people not to live with their co-defendant spouses 
or fiances, acts of public shaming such as requiring drunk driver to at all times wear pink bracelet labeled “D.U.I. 
CONVICT,” and restrictions on freedom of association with only a tenuous relationship to the actual crime of conviction); 
Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 GEORGETOWN L.J. 291 
(2016) (arguing that standard probation conditions construct a definition of recidivism that contributes to 
overcriminalization).
68  Petersilia, supra note 63, at 159. 
69 Id. at 165. 
70 See Hon. Philip H. Pennypacker & Alyssa Thompson, Realignment: A View from the Trenches, 53 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 991, 1033 (2013) (describing California flash incarceration program); See generally Lorenzo
Arroyo, Working Paper, Flash Incarceration: Due Process in an Era of Intermediate Sanctions (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/child-page/183091/doc/slspublic/Flash_Incarceration_
Arroyo.pdf [http://perma.cc/DQ7Q-8E32]. AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASS’N, INDIVIDUAL STATE PROFILES
SUMMIT ON EFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO PROBATION AND PAROLE VIOLATIONS (Dec. 11-12, 2012), https://www.appa-
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Parole enables prisoners to complete their sentences under supervision rather than 
serving their entire sentences in prison. Although most states restricted the use of parole in the 
1970s (and the federal prison system and some states abolished discretionary parole), substantial 
numbers of people are released from prison to parole supervision each year.71 Like probation, 
release on parole involves restrictions on liberty and onerous supervision requirements.72 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that “parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than 
probationers” because rather than being part of the original sentence, parole is a conditional 
release from what would otherwise be continued incarceration.73 Since the 1970s, parole 
supervision has also largely shifted from a casework model aimed at “restoring offenders to the 
community” into a supervision model whose primary goals are to closely monitor parolees and 
punish them for failing to meet all required conditions.74
c. How Community Corrections and Supervision Feed Back into Mass Incarceration 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, reincarcerations accounted for one-fifth of 
all exits from probation and more than a quarter of all exits from parole in 2015, most of which 
occurred because the supervisee had violated one or more probation or parole conditions.75 As 
Cecelia Klingele argued in a recent law review article, community supervision often functions 
more like a “deferred sentence of incarceration” than a true alternative to incarceration.76 Klingele 
notes that while conditions like curfews, monthly financial disclosures, restrictions on who the 
supervisee can socialize with, and required treatment programs may be reasonable when 
considered individually, the “sheer number of requirements imposes a nearly impossible burden 
on many offenders.”77 A study of courts in Wisconsin found that defendants sentenced to 
community supervision were subject to an average of thirty conditions per person.78 The more 
stringent the conditions, the higher the risk that the supervisee will be unable to successfully exit 
supervision.79 Additionally, supervisees who are offered rehabilitative interventions, such as 
counseling or drug treatment, are often more likely to end up having probation or parole revoked 
                                                                  
net.org/eWeb/Resources/SPSP/State-Profiles-Individual.pdf [http://perma.cc/2UF3-6ZY3] (describing flash incarceration 
authority in Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington); 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO PROBATION VIOLATIONS: DUE PROCESS AND 
SEPARATION OF POWERS ISSUES (2012), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/Education/admin%20
sanctions%20legal%20memo%2012-18.ashx [http://perma.cc/TS7W-A2AQ] (analyzing whether flash incarceration is 
permissible under due process and separation of powers).
71  Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Failure of Parole: Rethinking the Role of the State in Reentry, 41 N.M.
L. REV. 421, 433-34 (2011); Klingele, supra note 67, at 1027-28. 
72 See id. at 435-36 (describing typical conditions, and noting the number and types of conditions have 
increased over the last fifty years). 
73 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006) (upholding police officer’s suspicionless, warrantless 
search of parolee). 
74  Scott-Hayward, supra note 71, at 439; Klingele, supra note 67, at 1028. 
75 See Kaeble & Bonczar, supra note 51, at 4, tbl. 3, 6, tbl. 5.
76  Klingele, supra note 67, at 1020. 
77 Id. at 1035. 
78  KIT VAN STELLE & JANAE GOODRICH, UNIV. WIS. POPULATION HEALTH INST., THE 2008/2009 STUDY
OF PROBATION AND PAROLE REVOCATION 158 (2009), https://uwphi.pophealth.wisc.edu/about/staff/van-stelle-kit/2008-
2009-study-of-probation-and-parole-revocation.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZM5-SR89]. 
79  Petersilia, supra note 63, at 165. 
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than those who are not offered treatment services.80 This makes intuitive sense—the more 
frequently a person must travel to check in with a probation or parole officer, go to court (which 
often involves long waits before one’s case is called), and attend required programming, the more 
difficult it is for that person to maintain a job and keep strong family connections. Yet 
maintaining employment and supporting one’s family are often themselves set as conditions of 
supervision—leaving the supervisee caught between the Scylla of failure to check in and the 
Charybdis of unemployment.81
Community corrections facilities suffer from similar issues. For people who are already 
at a low risk of recidivism, residential “rehabilitation” programs can actually increase the 
likelihood of future criminal justice involvement.82 As criminal justice researchers Lowenkamp 
and Latessa put it, “[w]hen we take lower-risk offenders, who by definition are fairly prosocial (if 
they weren’t, they wouldn’t be low-risk), and place them in a highly structured, restrictive 
program, we actually disrupt the factors that make them low-risk” by cutting them off from 
prosocial contacts such as jobs, family, and peers.83
For these reasons, both community supervision and community corrections facilities can 
function as easy paths back to incarceration.84 Indeed, one study recently concluded that patterns 
of probation and incarceration after the mid-1980s are “consistent with the idea of probation as a 
net-widener that played a role in the build-up of mass incarceration, with both populations 
expanding throughout the build-up.”85
3. Criminal Justice Debt as a Further Path into Incarceration 
In many places, defendants who cannot afford to pay fines and fees imposed on 
conviction—which frequently add up to thousands of dollars, and can even accumulate interest 
while the person is incarcerated—end up being placed on supervision to pay these debts, and then 
being arrested and re-jailed solely for failing to pay them off. This phenomenon—dubbed 
“modern-day debtors’ prisons” in 2010 by the ACLU and the Brennan Center for Justice—
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.86
Nevertheless, modern-day debtors’ prisons remain widespread. In 2014 and 2015 alone, 
the ACLU, Southern Poverty Law Center, and Equal Justice Under Law filed debtors’ prison 
                                                                  
80  Klingele, supra note 67, at 1038. 
81 See, e.g., 2015 SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 66, at § 5B1.3(c) (standard conditions of 
probation in the federal system include “the defendant shall support the defendant’s dependents and meet other family 
responsibilities” and “the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the probation officer for 
schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons”).
82 See generally, Edward J. Latessa & Christopher Lowenkamp, What Works in Reducing Recidivism?, 3 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 521 (2006). 
83  Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Understanding the Risk Principle: How and Why 
Correctional Interventions Can Harm Low-Risk Offenders, TOPICS IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 7 (2004), 
https://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/ccjr/docs/articles/ticc04_final_complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8L4-8PZ6].  
84 See Klingele, supra note 67, at 1058.
85  Michelle S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass 
Incarceration, 35 LAW & POL’Y 51, 64 (2013). 
86  ACLU, In for a Penny, supra note 49, at 81; BRENNAN CENTER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER
TO REENTRY, supra 49 at 19.  The U.S. Supreme Court held in Bearden v. Georgia that courts must inquire into a 
defendant’s reasons for failing to pay a fine or restitution before sentencing him to prison for that failure; to imprison 
someone merely because of poverty would be “fundamentally unfair.” Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69, 672 
(1983).
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lawsuits in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Washington.87 While there has never 
been a comprehensive, national survey of how many people are incarcerated for criminal justice 
debt, it is clear that debtors’ prisons are not restricted to one region of the country; in-depth 
reports by the U.S. Department of Justice, the ACLU, and others have documented debtors’ 
prisons in states as far-flung as Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and Washington.88
Moreover, the widespread reliance of the criminal justice system on such fines and fees heightens 
the risks that local courts will engage in such practices.89
4. Immigration Detention 
Immigration detention is another component of mass incarceration. It is carried out under 
the authority of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the interior enforcement 
agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Its purpose is not to punish, but to 
hold people while their civil immigration proceedings are pending. In practice, however, 
immigrants are detained in jails and jail-like facilities.90
ICE detention is far smaller than the criminal justice system as a whole: with its daily 
capacity of 34,000 detention beds, ICE holds about as many people as all of the parish jails in 
Louisiana.91 However, the immigration detention system is important to examine because it has 
been a vanguard of both privatized, for-profit incarceration and privatized, for-profit supervision. 
It is estimated that more than 60% of immigration detention beds are run by private prison 
companies.92 These privately run beds are located both in private prisons dedicated to immigration 
                                                                  
87 Shutting Down Debtors’ Prisons, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/ 
current-cases/ending-debtors-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/CBJ4-JALZ] (last visited on Feb. 24, 2016); SPLC lawsuit closes 
debtors’ prison in Alabama, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.splcenter.org/ 
news/2014/08/26/splc-lawsuit-closes-debtors’-prison-alabama-capital [https://perma.cc/VMK6-BGQD]; Kennedy v. City 
of Biloxi, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/kennedy-v-city-biloxi [https://perma.cc/XD82-DRTT] (last updated Sept. 27, 
2016); Fuentes v. Benton County, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/fuentes-v-benton-county [https://perma.cc/FS6A-
YSXZ] (last updated June 1, 2016).  
88  ACLU, In for a Penny, supra note 49, at 17, 29, 43, 55, 65; The Outskirts of Hope, ACLU OF OHIO (Apr.
4, 2014), http://www.acluohio.org/the-outskirts-of-hope [https://perma.cc/Q2BP-DQ79] (last updated Mar. 14, 2014); US
DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (March 4, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR49-V39T]; See generally
Koran Addo, ArchCity Defenders saw problems with municipal courts before Ferguson turmoil, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Apr. 15, 2015),  http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/archcity-defenders-saw-problems-with-municipal-
courts-before-ferguson-turmoil/article_f1493907-7c8c-55af-a68b-6e36df0c2cae.html [https://perma.cc/7WPN-SEUD]. 
89 See ACLU, In for a Penny, supra note 49, at 9. 
90 See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT REPORT: THE STATE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES 184 (Sept. 2015), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/ Statutory_Enforcement_ 
Report2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KR5-DAPL]; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, JAILS AND JUMPSUITS: TRANSFORMING THE U.S.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM—A TWO-YEAR REVIEW 33  (2011), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/pdf/HRF-Jails-and-Jumpsuits-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7V7-53WQ].  
91 See TODD D. MINTON ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF JAILS: POPULATION
CHANGES, 1999-2013, at 15 T.9 (Dec. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cjpc9913.pdf [https://perma.cc/86HE-
58PX].
92  BETHANY CARSON & ELEANA DIAZ, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, PAYOFF: HOW CONGRESS ENSURES
PRIVATE PRISON PROFIT WITH AN IMMIGRATION DETENTION QUOTA 6 (Apr. 2015), http://grassrootsleadership.org/ 
reports/payoff-how-congress-ensures-private-prison-profit-immigrant-detention-quota [https://perma.cc/7PNR-SVTY]. 
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detention and in privatized county jails that contract out some or all of their beds to ICE. (Just 
11.8% of ICE beds are actually operated by the agency itself.)93 Additionally, since 2004, ICE has 
entirely contracted out the function of supervising immigrants on release—both the contract for 
intensive supervision (“ISAP”) and a recent family supervision contract have been awarded to 
subsidiaries of GEO Group, a private prison company.94 As of February 2016, GEO reported that 
there were some 44,000 people being supervised under its ISAP contract; the number of people 
being supervised under the new family case management contract has not yet been publicly 
reported.95 The current state of immigration detention—most notably, ICE’s apparent inability to 
carry out significant functions except through private-prison contractors—is largely a product of 
the agency’s rapid growth. In 1985, ICE’s predecessor agency held fewer than 5,000 people in 
immigration detention—but that figure more than quadrupled by the year 2000.96 When combined 
with a lack of in-house correctional expertise and a disinclination to build its own detention 
facilities, these rapidly increasing demands left ICE with a clear path of least resistance: private 
prisons.
The resulting dependence of ICE on these private-prison contractors should serve as a 
cautionary tale for criminal justice agencies that are considering greater reliance on such 
contractors. Depending largely on the detention contractor’s willingness or resistance to adopt 
new standards, ICE detention contracts may specify no standards at all, standards that date back to 
the year 2000 (before the creation of DHS and ICE), interim 2008 standards, or the most recent 
2011 standards.97 And these standards are poorly enforced; ICE’s oversight mechanisms often fail 
to identify and address violations, and do not punish detention contractors even when substandard 
medical care contributes to preventable deaths in detention.98 Significant concerns have been 
                                                                  
93 See id. at 3; NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION TRANSPARENCY &
HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT: AUGUST 2015 REPORT 5 (Aug. 2015), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrant 
justice.org/files/images/NIJC%20Transparency%20and%20Human%20Rights%20Project%20August%202015%20Report
%20FINAL3.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUT3-53EW]. 
94  RUTGERS SCHOOL OF LAW-NEWARK IMMIGRATION RIGHTS CLINIC, FREED BUT NOT FREE 8  
(July 2012), http://lastradainternational.org/lsidocs/Freed%20but%20not%20Free.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2JZ-DNR9] 
(describing 2004 contract award to BI, Inc.); Isaacs, supra note 6, at 8 (describing GEO acquisition of BI, Inc.); John 
Burnett, As Asylum Seekers Swap Prison Beds For Ankle Bracelets, Same Firm Profits, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Nov. 13, 
2015 4:56 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/13/455790454/as-asylum-seekers-swap-prison-beds-for-ankle-bracelets-
same-firm-profits [https://perma.cc/B4WX-44WF] (describing 2015 ICE contract award to GEO Care). 
95  George Zoley, The GEO Group’s (GEO) CEO George Zoley on Q4 2015 Results - Earnings Call 
Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA 8 (Feb. 17, 2016 5:29 PM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/3904376-geo-groups-geo-ceo-
george-zoley-q4-2015-results-earnings-call-transcript?page=8 [https://perma.cc/6JKP-QB96]. 
96 See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CAL. L. REV.
1449, 1466 (2015) (illustrating rapid growth of immigration detention). 
97  GAO, GAO-15-153, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN
MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF FACILITY COSTS AND STANDARDS 30 (Oct. 2014), http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/670/666467.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ5Y-C5HE]; NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, THE IMMIGRANT
DETENTION TRANSPARENCY AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT: AUGUST 2015 REPORT 6 (Aug. 2015), http://immigrant 
justice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/images/NIJC%20Transparency%20and%20Human%20Rights%20Project%20
August%202015%20Report%20FINAL3.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4FS-XJWF]. 
98 See GAO, supra note 97; DETENTION WATCH NETWORK & NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER,
THE IMMIGRATION DETENTION TRANSPARENCY AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, LIVES IN PERIL: HOW INEFFECTIVE
INSPECTIONS MAKE ICE COMPLICIT IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION ABUSE (Oct. 2015), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/ 
immigrantjustice.org/files/THR-Inspections-FOIA-Report-October-2015-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHB6-VF6U]; 
ACLU, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, & NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, FATAL NEGLECT: HOW ICE IGNORES
DEATHS IN DETENTION (Feb. 2016), http://immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/Fatal%20Neglect_ACLU
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raised about over-use of GPS tracking by the GEO Group subsidiary that ICE relies on for ISAP. 
Such over-use appears to be incentivized by the contract, which both allows the contractor to 
select the level of supervision for each individual and compensates the contractor more 
generously when it puts a person on GPS tracking instead of less-intrusive telephone check-ins.99
However, ICE currently has no choice but to rely on GEO Group or a similar contractor for these 
tasks because the agency lacks the capacity to carry out these functions itself. 
Accordingly, even if ICE ultimately decides to cease relying on private prisons for 
detention, the agency will have difficulty extricating itself from these relationships without 
seriously reducing its detention population and implementing a more robust spectrum of 
alternatives to detention.100 In December 2016, the Homeland Security Advisory Committee (a 
panel of experts appointed to advise the Secretary of Homeland Security on policy issues) 
recommended by a 17-to-5 vote that DHS make “a measured but deliberate shift away from the 
private prison model,” while noting that moving its current detention population into federally-run 
facilities would “take years, carry significant costs, and require congressional partnership.”101
5. The Role of Private Prisons in the Carceral State 
Nationwide, about 7% of state prisoners and 18% of federal prisoners are held in private 
prisons run by for-profit companies.102 However, there are major variations from state to state. For 
example, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the State of Alabama houses fewer than 
500 prisoners in private prisons—but more than 14,000 Texas prisoners and more than 12,000 
Florida prisoners are in the custody of private prisons.103 Meanwhile, more than 60% of ICE’s 
34,000 immigration detention beds are in private prisons.104 Additionally, the private prison  
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Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 45, 91-92 (2014) 
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100 See Takei et al., Shutting Down the Profiteers, supra note 15, at 15-17. 
101  Carl Takei & Joanne Lin, In Stunning Reversal, Law Enforcement, Military, and Security Advisors Urge 
Homeland Security to Shift Away from Private Prisons, ACLU (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-
freely/stunning-reversal-law-enforcement-military-and-security-advisors-urge-homeland (explaining committee vote and 
findings); HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZED DETENTION
FACILITIES 2 & n.3, 11 n.14 (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20HSAC%20
PIDF%20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/48G3-T33F] (noting that the full committee voted to endorse the 
dissenting subcommittee view in footnote 14 calling for a phase out of private prisons, and to reject the subcommittee’s 
majority recommendation regarding continued reliance on private prisons).
102  PRISONERS IN 2015, supra note 9, at 28, app. tbl. 2. 
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104  Carson & Diaz, supra note 92, at 3, 6. 
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industry is increasingly diversifying into for-profit community corrections facilities and for-profit 
post-release supervision, as well as supervised release for non-citizens awaiting outcomes in their 
immigration cases.105
While it has historical antecedents in both the Eighteenth-century English “keeper” 
system and the post-Civil War practice of “convict leasing,” the modern private prison industry 
did not begin until 1983, with the founding of Corrections Corporation of America106
(“CCA/CoreCivic”).107 In the ensuing decades, private prisons grew rapidly—from a population 
of approximately 7,000 prisoners in 1990, to 87,000 in 2000, to more than 126,000 in 2015108—
because mass incarceration enabled them to make alluring offers to both their host communities 
and state correctional officials. To struggling rural towns with few opportunities for economic 
growth, the private prisons offered the prospect of desperately-needed new jobs—and, with the 
seemingly limitless growth of the prison population, these jobs seemed like they would be secure 
for many years to come. In exchange, the host communities eagerly provided generous 
development subsidies, including tax-free construction bonds, property tax abatements, and 
subsidized road and sewer connections.109 To state correctional officials, the private prisons 
offered new prison space that could rapidly be brought online, did not require the state to commit 
                                                                  
105 See infra text accompanying notes 152-159. See also Isaacs, supra note 6, at 13.
106  In October 2016, CCA rebranded itself as “CoreCivic,” citing its expansion into reentry services and 
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(describing convict-lease system in Mississippi and subsequent creation of Parchman prison farm). 
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CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995 iv (Aug. 1997); ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2000 7, tbl. 8 (Aug. 2001); PRISONERS IN 2015, supra note 9, at 28, app. tbl 2. Note 
that this number is underinclusive because it does not include immigration detention facilities, which are heavily 
privatized.
109  Phillip Mattera et. al., GOOD JOBS FIRST, JAIL BREAKS: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES GIVEN TO 
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to funding construction or being responsible for the entire multi-decade lifecycle of the physical 
plant (that risk was, instead, borne by the host community), and would use the magic of the free 
market to increase efficiency and decrease costs to the state.110
Yet neither promise was fully realized. For host communities, recent research has 
concluded that building new private prisons is actually associated with negative local job growth 
and depressed wages.111 And there are numerous cautionary tales of rural towns that went deeply 
into debt to finance new private prisons only to be left with unpaid bills and ruined bond ratings 
after their prisoner contracts ended. (Meanwhile, the private prison companies were able to 
simply pack up and leave town.)112
As more and more prisoners are housed in private prisons, the early promises of 
flexibility and freedom give way to vendor lock-in: once a state houses a substantial number of 
people in private prisons, officials no longer have the ability to quickly cancel contracts and 
relocate prisoners if they become dissatisfied with the performance of the private prison 
industry.113 Take, for example, the infamous Kingman private prison in Arizona. In 2010, three 
men escaped unnoticed from Kingman and then carjacked and murdered an elderly couple before 
they were rearrested.114 A scathing security review by the Arizona Department of Corrections 
concluded that private prison company MTC’s staff were inexperienced, undertrained, and 
routinely ignored alarms; the state therefore removed 238 high-risk prisoners from Kingman until 
MTC could address the problems cited in the review.115 However, the company was unfazed; 
MTC even threatened to sue state officials, claiming that the state’s removal of these prisoners 
violated a 97% minimum occupancy guarantee in its contract. The state caved, agreeing to 
compensate MTC an additional $3 million for the empty prison beds.116 It was not until 2015,  
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after a riot injured 16 people and badly damaged the facility, that the state finally decided to 
cancel MTC’s contract—and awarded it to a different private prison company (GEO Group, 
which had contributed $52,000 to the governor’s reelection campaign).117
The lock-in problem is even worse when a private prison company both owns and 
manages the prison: in that situation, cancelling contracts and relocating prisoners would require 
government officials to either build an entire new prison or identify available space elsewhere 
(usually out-of-state) owned by another private prison company.118 In 2010, for example, the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons was considering whether to renew its contract with the GEO Group’s 
Reeves prison in Texas. Although BOP officials concluded that the prison contractor “did not 
fulfil [sic] contract terms from [2006] award until Oct. 2010,” “Lack of healthcare has greatly 
impacted inmate health and wellbeing,” and “Contractor shows little sign of improvement,” they 
chose to renew the contract because non-renewal would cost time and money and cause BOP to 
lose its “credibility as a solid customer” with the private prison companies.119 That “credibility” 
came at a price. A 2015 contract audit by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Inspector General 
identified numerous subsequent performance and staffing issues at Reeves as well as millions of 
dollars in “unallowable or unsupported costs” paid to the contractor.120
The limited competition in the private prison “market” further worsens the problem of 
vendor lock-in. The market is often described as an effective duopoly of CCA/CoreCivic and 
GEO Group.121 Together, these two companies dominate the market, with combined annual 
                                                                  
117  Craig Harris, Arizona cuts ties with private-prison operator over Kingman riot, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 
27, 2015, http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2015/08/26/arizona-kingman-riot-cause-corrections-
department-report/32432963/ [https://perma.cc/Q27V-YHQ4]; See Laurie Roberts, Roberts: Private prison contract goes 
to Ducey contributor, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 28, 2015, http://www.azcentral.com/story/opinion/op-ed/laurieroberts/2015/ 
10/28/roberts-private-prison-contract-goes-ducey-contributor/74750596/ [https://perma.cc/LY75-8VBK]. 
118  In statements to its investors, CCA/CoreCivic states that its owned-and-managed facilities have a 
greater than 90% contract retention rate because of “high barriers to entry & switching costs;” for its government 
customers, constructing a replacement prison would require “significant capital” and a “long construction timeline.” CCA,
FOURTH QUARTER 2015 INVESTOR PRESENTATION, at A-13, (Feb. 2016), http://www.cca.com/investors/presentations-
webcasts-events [https://perma.cc/SS6M-ZZZ5] (click on “Fourth Quarter 2015 Investor Presentation”). Both 
CCA/CoreCivic and GEO, the two largest private prison companies in the United States, have shifted most of their 
portfolios to owned-and-managed facilities rather than managed-only facilities. As of December 31, 2015, CCA/Corecivic 
reported that of its total portfolio of approximately 88,500 beds, only 15,048 (17%) were on management-only contracts 
and the remainder were owned by the company. CCA, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2015, at 53, 65 (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.cca.com/investors/financial-information/annual-
reports [https://perma.cc/D6TM-ZU7M]. As of the same date, of GEO’s portfolio of 86,054 beds, 32,992 (38%) were on 
management-only contracts and the remainder were owned by the company. GEO, SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION,
FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL YEAR 2015, at 10 (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.snl.com/irweblinkx/QuarterlyResults.aspx? 
iid=4144107 [https://perma.cc/5SRR-7QL2]. 
119  ACLU, WAREHOUSED AND FORGOTTEN: IMMIGRANTS TRAPPED IN OUR SHADOW PRIVATE PRISON
SYSTEM, 54-55 (2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/060614-aclu-car-reportonline.pdf. [https://perma.cc/ 
LX6V-48EK].
120  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
PRISONS CONTRACT NO. DJB1PC007 AWARDED TO REEVES COUNTY, TEXAS TO OPERATE THE REEVES COUNTY
DETENTION CENTER I/II PECOS, TEXAS, i-ii, 17 (2015), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/a1515.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
KV93-74D3].
121 See, e.g., Henry Hoffman, Corrections Corp. of America Can Help Right Your Profile, SEEKING ALPHA
(Aug. 6, 2010, 10:15 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/219078-corrections-corp-of-america-can-help-right-your-
portfolio [https://perma.cc/6NVZ-GCKN]; Joe Weisenthal, This Investor Presentation For A Private Prison Is One of the 
Creepiest Presentations We’ve Ever Seen, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2012, 1:06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
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revenues exceeding $3 billion and nearly 175,000 facility beds.122 The third-largest private prison 
company, privately-held MTC, is markedly smaller; its corrections division consists of about 
26,000 beds.123 CCA/CoreCivic and GEO Group have acquired essentially all other competitors of 
any size.124 It is unlikely that the market will become more competitive in the future, because the 
significant capital requirements for prison construction and the established market advantages 
held by CCA/CoreCivic and GEO create high barriers to entry.125
Evidence of the claimed cost savings from private prisons has been at best mixed. For 
example, from 2008 to 2010, Arizona’s own Department of Corrections repeatedly concluded that 
the state was paying more money to house prisoners in private prisons than in comparable state 
prisons.126 A number of other studies have reached similar conclusions.127 Meanwhile, the most 
prominent study to date finding that private prisons offered a better value than public prisons was 
actually the subject of a university ethics complaint because its authors failed to disclose the 
                                                                  
the-private-prison-business-2012-3 [https://perma.cc/37MX-9MLY]; Matt Kennard, US states seek to privatize prisons,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011, 6:21 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/6ba2792e-d00b-11e0-81e2-00144feabdc0.
122  Corrections Corporation of America (CXW) Income Statement, YAHOO! FINANCE,
https://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=CXW&annual [https://perma.cc/BB6R-YYUZ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016); The GEO 
Group, Inc (GEO) Income Statement, YAHOO! FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=GEO&annual 
[https://perma.cc/62V3-TRFV] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016); supra note 118 (discussing portfolios of CCA/CoreCivic and 
GEO).
123  MANAGEMENT & TRAINING CORPORATION, CORRECTIONS (2015), http://www.mtctrains.com/sites/ 
default/files/1pager_Corrections.pdf [https://perma.cc/B66E-GDN7]. 
124 See generally, GEO to Buy Cornell Companies for $685 Million, DEALBOOK (April 19, 2010, 7:32 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/geo-to-buy-cornell-companies-for-685-million/ [https://perma.cc/D5V6-
Z42Y]; see generally, The GEO Group Announces Acquisition of Eight Correctional and Detention Facilities Totaling 
More Than 6,500 Beds, BUSINESS WIRE (Jan. 26, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/ 
news/home/20150126005618/
en/GEO-Group-Announces-Acquisition-Correctional-Detention-Facilities [https://perma.cc/D3ZD-JJVD]. 
125 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF OREGON INVESTMENT GROUP, CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA 6 
(Nov. 19, 2009), http://uoinvestmentgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Corrections-Corp.-of-America.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JB33-ESZX]; Mike Fee, Corrections Corporation vs. GEO Group: Which Prison Stock Should You 
Buy?, THE MOTLEY FOOL (June 16, 2014, 7:03 AM), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/06/16/corrections-
corporation-vs-geo-group-which-prison.aspx [https://perma.cc/4XAF-3UTM]; See also, CCA, FOURTH QUARTER 2015
INVESTOR PRESENTATION, supra note 118, at 14, A-13 (noting high barriers to entry). 
126  AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, PRIVATE PRISONS: THE PUBLIC’S PROBLEM, 19-21 (Feb.
2012), https://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/AFSC_Arizona_Prison_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4CZD-DXCV] (summarizing cost comparisons); Craig Harris, Arizona faces growing cost of private prisons, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Dec. 29, 2013, http://archive.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131204arizona-private-prisons-growing-
cost.html [https://perma.cc/D295-CDLV] (the last such cost comparison was conducted in 2010 because the Arizona 
legislature repealed the cost comparison statute in 2012). John Kavanagh, Private prisons really are cheaper for 
taxpayers, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Jan. 10, 2014, 10:41AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/opinions/articles/20140111 
private-prisons-keep-money-taxpayers-pockets.html [https://perma.cc/52PQ-GVDD]. 
127 See, e.g., STATE OF HAWAII, THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 10-10, MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY’S CONTRACTING FOR PRISON BEDS AND SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR
AND THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF HAWAI’I, 16 (2010) (finding that Hawaii Department of Public Safety 
“repeatedly misled lawmakers and the public” by reporting inaccurate incarceration costs that favored sending prisoners to 
CCA/CoreCivic private prisons on the Mainland instead of publicly-operated prisons in Hawaii); GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-6, COST OF PRISONS: BUREAU OF PRISONS NEEDS BETTER DATA TO ASSESS
ALTERNATIVES FOR ACQUIRING LOW AND MINIMUM SECURITY FACILITIES 2, 4 (2007) (finding that BOP failed to collect 
adequate data to determine whether private federal prisons were more or less expensive than publicly operated federal 
prisons).
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funding they received from the private prison industry.128 And there is evidence that private 
prisons are artificially deflating their average costs by cherry-picking young, healthy prisoners 
who are the least expensive to house.129
Additionally, correctional officials and the public slowly realized that handing control of 
prisons over to for-profit companies has profound human consequences. In slightly more than 
thirty years of operation, the private prison industry has racked up a long and disturbing record of 
abuse, neglect and misconduct. 
To take just a few examples: In what has become known as the “Kids for Cash” scandal, 
two Pennsylvania juvenile court judges were convicted of accepting some $2.6 million in 
kickbacks in exchange for sending thousands of juvenile defendants to private prisons from 2002 
to 2009.130 One Idaho prison operated by CCA/CoreCivic was so brutal that prisoners nicknamed 
it “the Gladiator School,” and a study by the Idaho Department of Corrections found that more 
acts of violence occurred in the Gladiator School than Idaho’s seven other prisons combined. The 
ACLU sued over the culture of violence and brutality in this prison in 2010 and reached a 
settlement with CCA/CoreCivic in 2011—but the company broke that agreement and repeatedly 
falsified security staffing records, leading a federal judge to find the company in contempt of 
court in 2013.131 In Ohio, the state sold a public prison to CCA/CoreCivic in 2011; by the end of 
                                                                  
128  Matt Stroud, Corporations are using dubious research to take over prisons, THE VERGE, Aug. 6, 2014; 
Martha Woodall, Temple completes probe of profs’ prison study, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 18, 2014. The widely-
circulated working paper and numerous op-eds published by the authors did not disclose the funding sources. See Simon 
Hakim & Erwin Blackstone, Cost Analysis of Public and Contractor-Operated Prisons, (Apr. 2013) (Working Paper, 
Temple University); Simon Hakim & Erwin Blackstone, Op-Ed, Data shows running prisons for profit is a win-win,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 7, 2013); Simon Hakim & Erwin Blackstone, Op-Ed, Private prisons offer big savings for 
Maine corrections budget, KENNEBEC JOURNAL (May 23, 2013); Simon Hakim & Erwin Blackstone, Op-Ed, Temple
economics professors: Private prisons make fiscal sense, NEWSOK (May 17, 2013); Erwin Blackstone & Simon Hakim, 
Op-Ed, Blackstone, Hakim: Prison privatization can provide real benefits, SUN-SENTINEL (May 7, 2013). The final 
version of the study, published in non-peer-reviewed form by a libertarian think tank, belatedly disclosed the funding the 
authors received from the private prison industry. See SIMON HAKIM & ERWIN A. BLACKSTONE, PRISON BREAK: A NEW
APPROACH TO PUBLIC COST AND SAFETY (June 2014) (“The authors of the study were partially funded by members of the 
private corrections industry. No other funding was provided.”). 
129 See Christopher Petrella, The Color of Corporate Corrections, Part II: Contractual Exemptions and the 
Overrepresentation of People of Color in Private Prisons, RADICAL CRIMINOLOGY, No. 3, 81, 82-85 (Dec. 2013) 
(concluding that people of color are overrepresented in private prisons compared to public prisons, and attributing this to 
policies that allow private prisons to select for younger, healthier prisoners, who happen to be disproportionately people of 
color); Richard A. Oppel, Jr. Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/us/19prisons.html [https://perma.cc/9QUG-SWHU] (quoting Arizona state legislator 
accusing private prisons of “cherry-picking” by taking the “easy prisoners” and leaving the “most expensive prisoners 
with the taxpayers”). Indeed, in early 2015, the newly-appointed head of the Florida Department of Corrections candidly 
admitted to legislators that the private prison companies are allowed to cherry-pick the “least violent and the healthiest 
inmates,” although she backtracked on the remarks the following day. Sascha Cordner, Could Florida’s New DOC Head 
Be Backing Away From Certain Earlier Candid Remarks?, WFSU (Jan. 21, 2015), http://news.wfsu.org/post/could-
florida-s-new-doc-head-be-backing-away-certain-earlier-candid-remarks [https://perma.cc/SA5S-8T6G].
130  Craig R. McCoy, Former Pa. judge gets 28 years in ‘kids for cash’ case, PHILLY.COM (Aug. 12, 2011), 
http://articles.philly.com/2011-08-11/news/29876628_1_ciavarella-michael-t-conahan-juvenile-court
[https://perma.cc/24CT-EPHN]; Ian Urbina, Despite Red Flags About Judges, a Kickback Scheme Flourished, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/28/us/28judges.html [https://perma.cc/LP7P-S7QF]. 
131  Press Release, ACLU Lawsuit Charges Idaho Prison Officials Promote Rampant Violence,
ACLU (Mar. 11, 2010), www.aclu.org/news/aclu-lawsuit-charges-idaho-prison-officials-promote-rampant-violence 
[https://perma.cc/2SWW-P8T8]; Carl Takei & Stephen Pevar, CCA At It Again: Held in Contempt for Understaffing 
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2012, the prison had experienced a 300% increase in prisoner-on-staff assaults and a 180% 
increase in prisoner-on-prisoner assaults since the last state correctional inspection.132 In 2012, a 
federal judge described how a private prison operated by GEO Group, Inc. for young men and 
teenagers in Mississippi had devolved into “a cesspool of unconstitutional and inhuman acts and 
conditions” and “a picture of such horror as should be unrealized anywhere in the civilized 
world,” and ordered mass transfers out of the prison.133 At another private prison in Mississippi 
(first run by GEO Group and then taken over by MTC, another private prison company), an 
ACLU lawsuit detailed grisly allegations of abuse and neglect, including rampant rapes, people 
held in solitary confinement with untreated mental illnesses, guards ignoring fires set in cells, and 
malnourishment and chronic hunger.134 An ACLU report, a subsequent investigative report in The
Nation, and three reports by the Justice Department’s Inspector General detailed how profit-
seeking in the BOP’s private prisons for immigrants led to overcrowding, understaffing, and 
deaths from shockingly bad medical care.135 These findings were so horrifying that in August 
2016, the Justice Department concluded that private prisons “compare poorly to our own bureau 
facilities” and announced a multi-year phase-out of the BOP’s private prison contracts.136 (The 
election of Donald Trump as president has, however, raised questions about the future of this 
phase-out plan.137) Additionally, a number of studies have found that violence is more prevalent in 
                                                                  
Prison and Lying About It, ACLU (Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/blog/cca-it-again-held-contempt-understaffing-
prison-and-lying-about-it [https://perma.cc/2NLK-FWT4]; Kelly v. Wengler, No. 1:11-cv-00185-EJL (D. Idaho Sept. 16, 
2013) (order finding CCA/CoreCivic in contempt of court), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/kelly-v-wengler-
memorandum-decision-and-order-finding-cca-civil-contempt?redirect=prisoners-rights/kelly-v-wengler-memorandum-
decision-and-order-finding-cca-civil-contempt [https://perma.cc/AQE9-ARQC]. See also Letter from Randy Blades, 
Warden, Idaho Dep’t of Correction, to Phillip Valdez, Warden, Idaho Correctional Center (Aug. 28, 2008) (on file with 
the author) (“Since the beginning of 2008, incidents of violence at the Idaho Correctional Center has [sic] steadily 
increased to the point that there are four incidents for every one that occurs in the rest of the Idaho state operated facilities
combined.”).
132 Another Bad Inspection for CCA-Owned Lake Erie Correctional Institution, ACLU OF OHIO:
PRISONERS’ RIGHTS PRESS RELEASE (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.acluohio.org/archives/press-releases/another-bad-
inspection-for-cca-owned-lake-erie-correctional-institution [https://perma.cc/7NU8-8V3N].  
133  Order Approving Settlement, DePriest v. Epps, et al., No. 3:10-cv-00663-CWR, at 5-6 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 
26, 2012).  This came not long after the U.S. Department of Justice issued a similar report describing staff sexual 
misconduct at Walnut Grove as “brazen” and among the worst that DOJ had seen “in any facility anywhere in the nation.” 
Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Asst. Attorney General Civil Rights Division, to Phil Bryant, Mississippi Governor, Re: 
Investigation of the Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/crt/legacy/2012/04/09/walnutgrovefl.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KEB-8DYR].
134  Complaint, Dockery v. Epps, Civil Action No. 3:13-cv-00326 (S.D. Miss. May 30, 2013), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-MS-0007-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/MT5U-3ME4]. 
135 See generally ACLU, WAREHOUSED AND FORGOTTEN, supra note 119; Seth Freed Wessler, Separate,
Unequal, and Deadly, THE NATION, Jan. 28, 2016, at 13-21; Office of the Inspector General, supra note 120; OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING OF 
CONTRACT PRISONS (2016), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf [https://perma.cc/9279-SP7V]; OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS’ CONTRACT WITH 
CORECIVIC, INC. TO OPERATE THE ADAMS COUNTY CORRECTIONAL CENTER IN NATCHEZ, MISSISSIPPI (2016),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1708.pdf [https://perma.cc/48P8-MLLU].  
136  Charlie Savage, U.S. to Phase Out Use of Private Prisons for Federal Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/us/us-to-phase-out-use-of-private-prisons-for-federal-inmates.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/DLT9-EQJW].  
137 See Jeff Sommer, Trump’s Win Gives Stocks in Private Prison Companies a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/your-money/trumps-win-gives-stocks-in-private-prison-companies-a-
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private prisons, and that recidivism is higher for people held in private prisons than public 
prisons.138
Despite this record, private prisons have grown into a multibillion-dollar industry. The 
two largest private prison companies—Corrections Corporation of America/CoreCivic and GEO 
Group—are both publicly traded, with annual revenues of, respectively, $1.79 billion and $1.84 
billion in 2015.139 They have developed into a potent lobbying force in both state and federal 
arenas, with their lobbying and campaign contributions targeted at particular states and particular 
congressional committees.140 For example, the Palm Beach Post reported that in Florida alone, 
private prison companies spent more than $4 million on state political parties, election committees 
and candidate campaigns between 2000 and 2013.141 In Oklahoma, private prisons skeptic Justin 
Jones was forced to resign from his position as Director of the Oklahoma Department of 
Corrections in 2013, reportedly because private prison lobbyists objected to his resistance to 
expanding privatization.142 His successor quickly expressed openness to more private prison 
contracts.143
The industry also exerts influence through indirect means. Arizona’s SB 1070 
legislation, which increased the state’s powers to jail immigrants, was based on model legislation  
                                                                  
reprieve.html [https://perma.cc/8CAC-3UW3] (discussing how private prison stocks rebounded after Trump’s  
election); Seth Freed Wessler, Donald Trump’s Looming Mass Criminalization, THE NATION (Nov. 28, 2016), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/donald-trumps-looming-mass-criminalization/ [https://perma.cc/CB3K-S3Y2] 
(describing likely BOP expansion under Trump). 
138  Curtis R. Blakely & Vic W. Bumphus, Private and Public Sector Prisons – A Comparison of Select 
Characteristics, 68 FED. PROBATION 27, 30 (2004) (concluding that “the private sector is a more dangerous place to be 
incarcerated,” and reporting that based on national data, “the private sector experienced more than twice the number of 
assaults against inmates than did the public sector.”); AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 110 at 52 (reported that “the 
privately operated facilities have a much higher rate of inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff assaults and other 
disturbances” than publicly operated facilities, when institutions of similar security levels are compared.); Anita 
Mukherjee, Do Private Prisons Distort Justice? Evidence on Time Served and Recidivism (Mar. 15, 2015), 
http://harris.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/NLSY97/Paper%20sent%20091715.pdf [https://perma.cc/UWJ9-CR7X] 
(finding that, compared to those in public prisons, people held in private prisons end up serving more time without 
attendant reductions in recidivism). 
139  CXW Income Statement, supra note 122; GEO Income Statement, supra note 122. 
140  JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, GAMING THE SYSTEM: HOW THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF PRIVATE
PRISON COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES (June 2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/ 
justicepolicy/documents/gaming_the_system.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV8C-DTWG]; BETHANY CARSON &
ELEANA DIAZ, GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, PAYOFF: HOW CONGRESS ENSURES PRIVATE PRISON PROFIT WITH 
AN IMMIGRATION DETENTION QUOTA 6 (Apr. 2015), http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/ 
reports/quota_report_final_digital.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP9N-BERJ]. 
141  Pat Beall, Money at the Statehouse? Prison firms pour it on, PALM BEACH POST (Nov. 16, 2013), 
http://www.mypalmbeachpost.com/news/news/money-at-the-statehouse-prison-firms-pour-it-on/nbtPN/
[https://perma.cc/BF7F-F4RC].
142  Barbara Hoberock, Corrections professionals connect DOC exec’s resignation to private prison 
lobbying, TULSA WORLD (June 19, 2013), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/government/corrections-professionals-
connect-doc-exec-s-resignation-to-private-prison/article_95bcaf7a-2906-5646-bb7f-ed4991af10a2.html
[https://perma.cc/KK8F-4NVF]; Sean Wallace, Playing politics with prison, OKLAHOMA GAZETTE (July 2, 2013), 
http://okgazette.com/2013/07/02/playing-politics-with-prison/ [https://perma.cc/8PM9-EUW5].
143 New Oklahoma Corrections director willing to use private prisons, NEWSOK (Feb. 22, 2014), 
http://newsok.com/article/3936345 [https://perma.cc/8N9H-84EJ]. 
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drafted by a committee of the American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”), a membership 
organization of state legislators and corporate interests. CCA/CoreCivic’s representative to ALEC 
participated in the ALEC meetings that generated this model legislation.144
There is a revolving door between correctional agencies and the private prison industry. 
In 2011, for example, Harley Lappin became an executive at CCA/CoreCivic less than a month 
after retiring from his position as Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons.145 Similarly, Stacia 
Hylton left the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee—where she was responsible for managing 
federal detention acquisitions for BOP, ICE, and the U.S. Marshals Service—in 2010 to consult 
for GEO Group, and then returned to head the U.S. Marshals Service later that year.146 A host of 
other high-level corrections officials have followed similar paths into the private prison 
industry.147 Additionally, private prison companies foster cozy relationships with corrections 
officials through sponsorships and contributions to industry associations such as the American 
Correctional Association, the American Jail Association, the Association of State Correctional 
Administrators, the Corrections Technology Association, and the National Sheriffs’ 
Association.148
Private prisons suffer from oversight and transparency problems. A 2012 report by the 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency concluded that oversight and monitoring of private 
prisons has “proven to be difficult and tends to be lax and ineffective.”149 Meanwhile, the public 
remains in the dark because many public records statutes do not reach documents held by private 
prison companies.150
The private prison industry depends on the expansion of the carceral state for its 
continued profitability. The annual reports that the two largest private prison companies file with 
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147 See, e.g., Cristina Costantini & Jorge Rivas, Shadow Prisons, FUSION.NET (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://interactive.fusion.net/shadow-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/Q3WS-EM3L] (listing former DOJ and DHS officials who 
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http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2010/09/07/117742/nm-secretary-penalize-prison/ [https://perma.cc/9HUD-U7EM].
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the SEC describe this relationship in frank terms. For example, CCA/CoreCivic’s 2014 annual 
report states: 
Our growth is generally dependent upon our ability to obtain new contracts to 
develop and manage correctional and detention facilities . . . . The demand for 
our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of 
enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or parole standards and sentencing 
practices or through the decriminalization of certain activities that are currently 
proscribed by criminal laws. For instance, any changes with respect to drugs 
and controlled substances or illegal immigration could affect the number of 
persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially reducing demand 
for correctional facilities to house them. Immigration reform laws are currently 
a focus for legislators and politicians at the federal, state, and local level. 
Legislation has also been proposed in numerous jurisdictions that could lower 
minimum sentences for some non-violent crimes and make more inmates 
eligible for early release based on good behavior. Also, sentencing alternatives 
under consideration could put some offenders on probation with electronic 
monitoring who would otherwise be incarcerated. Similarly, reductions in crime 
rates or resources dedicated to prevent and enforce crime could lead to 
reductions in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring incarceration at 
correctional facilities.151
As decarceration has become a greater topic of political discussion, the private prison 
industry has responded by adding community corrections facilities and community supervision to 
its portfolios, and adopting new messaging designed to accommodate the new bipartisan 
consensus that the United States holds too many people in prison. 
Between 2013 and 2016, CCA/CoreCivic acquired three companies—Correctional 
Alternatives, Inc., Avalon Correctional Services, and Correctional Management, Inc.—that 
operate community corrections facilities, and purchased other community corrections facilities in 
Pennsylvania. As a result, CCA/CoreCivic now has nearly 5,000 community correctional beds in 
its portfolio.152 The company sees clear opportunities in what it describes as a “fragmented” 
market for reentry services—i.e., an environment mainly populated by nonprofit and small, local 
for-profit entities—and CCA/CoreCivic executives claim the corporation’s size and 
diversification give it a competitive advantage.153 In August 2014, CCA/CoreCivic’s President 
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and CEO delivered a speech in which he claimed that “[r]eentry programs and reducing 
recidivism are 100 percent aligned with our business model,” and stated that thanks to the 
company’s new acquisitions of community corrections facilities, “[i]f policymakers put a major 
emphasis on community corrections—and many experts believe they should—CCA/CoreCivic is 
positioned to help.”154
GEO Group has also moved aggressively to expand into providing other types of carceral 
services. In 2011, GEO acquired Behavioral Interventions, Inc. (“BI”), a provider of GPS tracking 
services for criminal justice and immigration agencies.155 GEO has successfully widened the net 
for BI’s services in the immigration context, with ICE increasingly placing GPS monitors on 
Central American mothers released from family detention facilities. According to news reports, 
ICE increased its use of ankle-mounted GPS trackers by about forty percent in just the first half of 
2015, with both the equipment and staffing provided by GEO Group.156
GEO also provides the same GPS trackers and monitoring services for criminal justice 
agencies. In February 2016, GEO reported that its BI subsidiary was supervising some 139,000 
people, including 89,000 people on GPS supervision and other electronic tracking products.157
GEO has also been expanding its portfolio of residential community corrections facilities, day 
reporting centers, and juvenile facilities. In February 2016, the company reported that it had 
twenty-one residential community corrections facilities with some 3,000 beds, sixty-four day 
reporting centers supervising more than 4,000 people, and twelve juvenile residential facilities.158
As a result, the company’s annual reports have begun noting that while the company’s growth is  
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“primarily dependent” on prison, jail, and detention contracts, they are also able to grow based on 
“our ability to obtain new contracts to offer electronic monitoring services, provide community-
based re-entry services and provide monitoring and supervision services . . .”159
Meanwhile, privatized probation (which is currently entrenched in Alabama, Georgia, 
and a few other places in the South, but is still mainly performed by small local and regional 
companies) is a growing business that will become a natural acquisition target for CCA/CoreCivic 
and GEO in the coming years. Under the privatized probation model, a for-profit company takes 
over the entire probation function, with corporate “probation officers” exercising the same kinds 
of broad, discretionary authority as government probation officers. As discussed infra, this leads 
to serious abuses. 
D. The “User-Funded” Criminal Justice System 
Starting in the 1980s, the rising costs of the criminal justice system led a growing 
number of states to begin billing criminal defendants for the operation of the system that 
prosecutes them—euphemistically described as criminal justice “user fees.” By 2014, at least 
forty-three states and the District of Columbia permitted defendants to be billed for a public 
defender, at least forty-one states permitted prisoners to be charged room and board for jail and 
prison, and at least forty-four states permitted people to be billed for their own probation and 
parole supervision.160
Funding the criminal justice on the backs of people entangled in the system does not 
reduce crime. Instead, research indicates that charging such fees harms a person’s ability to 
reintegrate back into society after a criminal conviction.161 What the “user-funded” criminal 
justice system does enable, however, is further growth of the carceral state despite taxpayers’ 
unwillingness or inability to fund this juggernaut. And once the system is “user-funded,” private, 
for-profit companies are all too happy to take advantage. 
As a result, court-imposed criminal justice debts are hardly the only form of “user fees” 
charged to people ensnared in the system. Recently, the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) began to regulate the exorbitant telephone rates and ancillary fees charged to people in 
prison (and, by extension, their families and friends) by prison-specific phone companies.162 In the 
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absence of regulation, a corrupt system developed in which phone service providers offer 
“commission payments”—a form of legalized kickback that prison and jail administrators use to 
subsidize their operations—that can rise as high as 84.1% of the per-minute rates. As a result, 
prison and jail administrators typically award phone service contracts to whichever company 
promises the highest commissions. And the phone companies pass the cost of the commissions 
onto end-users through inflated per-minute rates, per-connection fees, account deposit fees, 
account maintenance charges, account refund charges, and other fees.163 Specialized banking 
services (which, for security reasons, are typically the only method by which people in prison and 
jail can purchase goods or services) take similar advantage of prisoners and their families, and are 
essentially unregulated.164 Such companies can squeeze a last round of profits from prisoners even 
after their release, by issuing released prisoners’ remaining money on high-fee debit cards that 
can charge withdrawal fees of up to three dollars per transaction and account closure fees of up to 
thirty dollars.165
The profiteering continues outside of prison walls. In some states, local jurisdictions 
have actually contracted out probation to for-profit companies, with disastrous results.166 These 
companies do not bill the courts that contract with them; instead, they make their profits by 
collecting fees from the people they supervise.167 Take, for example, Elvis Mann, a fifty-five year 
old man in Childersburg, Alabama, whose monthly income consists of $800 in disability benefits 
and approximately $300 in food stamps, and who was subject to private probation for committing 
several misdemeanor offenses. The court ordered him to pay $8,929 in fines and costs, and to go 
on probation with a company called Judicial Correction Services (“JCS”). Over a seven-year 
period, Mann paid off more than $6,500 of his judicial debt, typically in installments of $50 to 
$100 that he dropped off at the JCS office. Often, however, only about half of each installment 
payment went to pay off his debt to the court. The rest—more than $3,000—went into JCS’s 
pockets.168 Some companies may further inflate the bill; the Southern Center for Human Rights 
recently filed a lawsuit alleging that one private probation company is requiring defendants to pay 
for drug tests that the court never actually ordered.169
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Like government probation officers, private probation officers have the power to decide 
whether or not to seek a probation revocation hearing against their supervisees. In Georgia alone, 
Human Rights Watch found that 124,788 arrest warrants were issued in 2012 for people on 
private probation.170 The combination of these powers and the company’s desire for profit can 
turn probation meetings into shakedowns backed up by threats of arrest. One woman interviewed 
by Human Rights Watch described it this way: “Every time I went down there [to the private 
probation company’s office] they was nasty. They’d threaten me with jail and I said, ‘Please, 
don’t throw me in jail. I don’t want to lose my kid.’”171
Even where probation is not entirely privatized, for-profit companies have taken over 
key supervision functions like GPS monitoring—and bill criminal defendants for the costs of their 
own monitoring. These costs can be cripplingly high; for example, one private, for-profit GPS 
monitoring company reportedly charges supervisees $300 per month, plus a $179.50 setup fee, for 
their court-ordered GPS monitoring. Supervisees who fail to pay the fees are sent back to jail.172
The growth of the user-funded criminal justice system means that a frightening array of 
companies are able to profit from the continued flow of people into the criminal justice system 
and the inability of these people to escape the system, regardless of what happens to state or local 
budgets. And the more that government agencies hand off these functions to private entities, the 
more these profiteers will be able to block supervisees from exiting the criminal justice system. 
II. REFORM EFFORTS 
This section builds on Part I’s description of the carceral state by describing the origins 
and growth of current left-right reform efforts and explaining the divergent interests of the left 
and right in decarceration. This discussion lays the foundation for Part III’s argument that 
progressives should avoid relying solely on this alliance. 
A. Voices in the Wilderness 
In the early years of the War on Drugs, liberal leaders—including many Black leaders—
initially responded by lining up in support of harsher sentencing and heavier police presences in 
Black neighborhoods.173 For example, thirteen of the twenty voting members of the Congressional 
Black Caucus (“CBC”) supported the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986—including the now-
infamous 100:1 sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine that this bill created.174
As the growing carceral state consumed ever more people and neighborhoods from the 
1990s to the mid-2000s, a small handful of progressives began trying to raise alarms. But they 
were marginalized—voices in the wilderness. Although members of the CBC eventually reversed 
positions and called for an end to the sentencing disparities between crack sales and powder 
cocaine sales, a moral panic over drugs and urban crime continued to dominate the mainstream 
liberal discourse. In 1992, then-Governor Bill Clinton ran for president on an explicitly “tough on 
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crime” platform.175 After Clinton’s election, Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE) and Rep. Charles Schumer 
(D-NY) spearheaded an effort to develop and pass the 1994 Crime Bill, which—among other 
things—dramatically ratcheted up mandatory minimum sentences, expanded the federal death 
penalty, and authorized billions of dollars in funding for new prisons.176 Democrats in the 1994 
midterm congressional elections competed to show who could be the most effective “tough on 
crime” candidate.177 In 1996, President Clinton signed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act, dramatically curtailing the ability of convicted prisoners to challenge unjust 
sentences, and slamming the courthouse door on many wrongly-convicted prisoners.178 This 
rhetoric and action was replicated in state governments, which adopted numerous policy changes 
to make the criminal justice system harsher and symbolically denounce people who committed 
criminal offenses.179 By the year 2000, the Justice Policy Institute estimated that the United States 
had put more people behind bars in the 1990s than any other decade in the country’s history.180
During this time, mainstream liberals continued to stick to the “tough on crime” 
mantra.181 Meanwhile, mainstream civil rights organizations often decried individual instances of 
unfairness, but did not attack the larger system.182 The exceptions were relatively few in number 
and had distressingly little impact on the broader policy landscape.183 With the publication of 
Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow in 2010, however, these voices broke into the liberal 
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and progressive mainstream.184 As a then-new staff attorney at the ACLU’s National Prison 
Project, I was both excited and surprised to see how quickly mass incarceration became a near-
universal topic of discussion.185
B. The Critique from the Left 
The left has not coalesced around a single critique of mass incarceration or the carceral 
state. However, advocates on the left have articulated several key goals. Many of these goals have 
broad support from both mainstream and radical organizations. 
Ending the War on Drugs is one such goal. In many cases, this is explicitly linked to a 
racial justice critique that emphasizes the disparate enforcement of drug laws against people of 
color.186 It also typically involves a call to end the hyper-aggressive policing tactics associated 
with the War on Drugs, including the widespread use of military-style tactics and equipment, 
mass surveillance, and “jump out” squads.187
Another goal is the liberation of Black and Brown communities from the oppressive 
control of police and the criminal justice system. This is the core of the New Jim Crow critique 
and a major goal of the Black Lives Matter movement.  Black Lives Matter began in 2013 as part 
of a new burst of Black activism in response to George Zimmerman’s acquittal on both murder 
and manslaughter charges for shooting Trayvon Martin.188 However, it grew to national 
prominence in 2014 and 2015, as the movement forced white America and mainstream liberals to 
acknowledge the sheer number of unarmed Black people killed by police.189 In the words of one 
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of its founders, Black Lives Matter is “a response to the anti-Black racism that permeates our 
society and also, unfortunately, our movements.” Black Lives Matter seeks to secure the basic 
dignity and human rights of Black people, not just in the context of police killings and 
incarceration, but also in response to Black poverty, disenfranchisement, and other forms of 
oppression.190 Other grassroots organizations seek similar goals for Latino and immigrant 
communities, such as United We Dream and #Not1More.191
Ending harsh, arbitrary sentencing regimes such as Three Strikes and mandatory 
minimum sentencing is another widely-supported goal.192 Some are extending this critique beyond 
the most extreme manifestations of arbitrary sentencing. For example, Marc Mauer  
recently proposed that prison sentences should generally be limited to no more than twenty 
years—an idea borrowed from Norway and premised on the diminishing public safety returns of 
each successive year of incarceration.193
A further goal is to remove the profit motive from the criminal justice system. This 
means not just ending prisons operated entirely by for-profit companies, but also dismantling the 
providers of ancillary services—including medical care, telephone service, and prisoner financial 
services—that depend on and profit from the criminal justice system.194 In recent years, this has 
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become a particular rallying cry at universities: in 2013, students at Florida Atlantic University 
successfully blocked a private prison company from buying the naming rights to the college’s 
football stadium, and in 2015, students at Columbia University and the University of California 
system successfully campaigned for their schools to divest from private prison companies.195
A further goal is to remove barriers to former prisoners who are returning to the 
community and provide them with what is often described as a “second chance.” At a technocratic 
level, there is frequent discussion of these topics and a number of efforts have been undertaken to 
evaluate the impact of reentry programs on recidivism.196 However, it is important to distinguish 
between these efforts and a broader critique; as Gottschalk and others have pointed out, the terms 
“reentry” and “second chance” are deeply misleading in the context of deindustrialization and 
systemic racial inequality.197 Fortunately, there are a number of efforts by formerly incarcerated 
people to create these chances for others, rooted in values of human dignity and equality rather 
than the narrow goal of recidivism reduction. One example is Glenn Martin, a former prisoner 
who founded Just Leadership U.S.A. to build a grassroots, social-justice-oriented movement that 
emphasizes how “America has relentlessly relied on incarceration as a solution to complex social 
problems.”198 Critiques that link the carceral state to a broader critique of neoliberalism also play 
an important role, by reminding us that the carceral state must be understood within the context of 
larger American political, economic, and social forces that economically disenfranchise large 
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swaths of the population.199 These critiques highlight how ongoing unmet community needs and 
individual needs help contribute to growth and maintenance of the carceral state. 
The most radical and ambitious position on the left, and the one that seeks to unite all of 
these critiques, is outright abolition of prisons. As described by longtime activist scholar Angela 
Davis, prison abolitionists urge that rather than seeking out a single alternative to the existing 
system of incarceration, we should envision a whole range of new institutions to replace it: 
“demilitarization of schools, revitalization of education at all levels, a health system that provides 
free physical and mental care to all, and a justice system based on reparation and reconciliation 
rather than retribution and vengeance.”200 There are a number of local grassroots activists around 
the country who endorse prison abolition and are working to build individual institutions along 
these lines.201 Ultimately, however, prison abolition is inherently a revolutionary project. As 
Truthout editor Maya Schenwar put it, “The monumental shift toward a system structured by 
connection instead of isolation will be a shift so deep that it will leave this country 
unrecognizable.”202
Even for advocates who believe that prison abolition is an unrealistic goal, the 
abolitionist critique is important because it forces prison reform advocates to clarify the role that 
incarceration should play in society: If incarceration must continue to exist, then who should be 
incarcerated, for how long, in what kind of environment, and for what purposes? Are retribution 
and incapacitation sufficient justifications for forcibly removing people from their neighborhoods 
and exerting near-total control over their daily lives? If not, what must a prison accomplish in 
order to justify its existence? Asking these questions allows us to radically rethink our model of 
incarceration. The prison systems of various western European countries offer useful ideas that 
U.S. reformers can draw upon. Germany and the Netherlands, for example, treat rehabilitation and 
resocialization as the primary goals of incarceration. Rather than constantly dehumanizing the 
people in their custody, German and Dutch prisons rely on positive reinforcement, seek to 
maintain the connection between prisoners and the larger society, and consider their goal to be to 
help prisoners lead more productive, independent lives in society once they return to the 
communities.203
The abolitionist critique also raises difficult, important questions about what the societal 
response should be to poverty, substance abuse, mental illness, and other factors that contribute to 
crime and social disorder. By identifying answers to these questions that do not involve 
prosecution, we can chart out real alternatives to the criminal justice system instead of defaulting 
to dehumanizing “alternatives to incarceration” that merely function as prisons without walls. 
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C. The Right Speaks Out 
1. Right on Crime, the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the Koch Brothers 
Much like the mainstream left, mainstream conservatives spent the 1980s, 1990s and 
early 2000s contributing to the explosion of mass incarceration.204 During this time, a handful of 
libertarians—primarily at the Cato Institute—were raising alarms about both the War on Drugs 
and mass incarceration, but were largely ignored by mainstream conservatives.205 Additionally, 
Chuck Colson was a lonely voice among evangelicals calling for prison reform.206 By the mid-
2000s, Pat Nolan, David Keene, Richard Viguerie, and Grover Norquist had joined this small 
cadre of criminal justice skeptics.207 In 2010, after Newt Gingrich joined the cadre, they agreed 
that the time was ripe for them to launch a public campaign to rally conservatives to end mass 
incarceration, and announced the “Right on Crime” campaign late that year.208 Supported by the 
staff of the Texas Public Policy Foundation (an Austin-based libertarian and conservative think 
tank), Right on Crime rolled out its reform agenda in 2011 with a series of op-eds from Gingrich, 
Norquist, and Nolan.209
Right on Crime frames criminal justice reform in terms of familiar conservative ideas: 
“constitutionally limited government, transparency, individual liberty, personal responsibility, 
free enterprise, and the centrality of the family and community.”210 Right on Crime’s statement of 
principles devotes significant attention to fiscal conservative principles, such as evaluating the 
criminal justice system on whether it provides “the best possible results at the lowest possible 
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cost” and being “tough on criminal justice spending.”211 It also includes a strong emphasis on the 
rights of crime victims, identifying them as “key ‘consumers’” of the criminal justice system 
along with the general public and taxpayers (but, notably, not criminal defendants).212 It appeals to 
religious and conservative values by emphasizing rehabilitation through “harnessing the power of 
families, charities, faith-based groups, and communities”—a list that conspicuously omits the 
government’s potential role in rehabilitation.213 And finally, it suggests limits on white-collar 
prosecutions: “Criminal law should be reserved for conduct that is either blameworthy or 
threatens public safety, not wielded to grow government and undermine economic freedom.”214
Right on Crime exhibits no discomfort with private prisons. In fact, although Right on 
Crime later removed all references to privatization from its website, its original website explicitly 
endorsed private prisons as part of the “Conservative Solution” for criminal justice: 
For those instances when prisons are necessary, explore private prison options. 
A study by The Reason Foundation indicated that private prisons offer cost 
savings of 10 to 15 percent compared to state-operated facilities. By including 
an incentive in private corrections contracts for lowering recidivism and the 
flexibility to innovate, private facilities could potentially not just save money 
but also compete to develop the most cost-effective recidivism reduction 
programming.215
From 2011 onward, Right on Crime gained momentum and conservative credibility. By 
late 2015, Right on Crime had collected an impressive roster of mainstream conservatives who 
supported its principles, including former Texas governor Rick Perry, former Florida governor 
Jeb Bush, former Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, the Heritage Foundation’s Stephen 
Moore, and ALEC’s Lisa B. Nelson.216
Right on Crime soon attracted the support of the Heritage Foundation. However, the 
Heritage Foundation has no deep ideological commitment to decarceration. For example, the 
Heritage Foundation never expressed opposition to the prison boom of the 1980s and 1990s, 
continues to oppose drug law reform, and its stances on criminal justice issues give short shrift to 
principles of redemption and forgiveness.217 During the 1980s and 1990s, Heritage Foundation’s 





215 Priority Issues: Prisons, RIGHT ON CRIME, available in archived format at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110514100747/http://www.rightoncrime.com/priority-issues/prisons/
[https://perma.cc/N2W7-7PSJ] (as visited May 14, 2011). 
216 Statement of Principles, RIGHT ON CRIME, available in archived format at https://web.archive.org/web/
20151214022833/http://rightoncrime.com/statement-of-principles/ [https://perma.cc/G2XG-6NN7] (as visited Dec. 14, 
2015).
217 See John M. Broder, No Hard Time for Prison Budgets, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/19/weekinreview/no-hard-time-for-prison-budgets.html [https://perma.cc/JFE2-WJLY]
(opposing cost-driven sentencing reform); Charles D. Stimson, Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/legalizing-marijuana-
why-citizens-should-just-say-no [https://perma.cc/96JN-297V] (opposing marijuana legalization); Charles D. Stimson & 
Andrew M. Grossman, Adult Time for Adult Crimes: Life Without Parole for Juvenile Killers and Violent Teens, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Aug. 2009), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/Adult-Time-for-Adult-Crimes-
Life-Without-Parole-for-Juvenile-Killers-and-Violent-Teens [https://perma.cc/99QH-6K46] (arguing that the United 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol20/iss2/3
2017] FROM MASS INCARCERATION TO MASS CONTROL, AND BACK AGAIN 163 
main contributions to the criminal justice policy debate were to endorse prison privatization and 
harsher sentences, including expansion of mandatory minimum sentencing.218 Nevertheless, in the 
past five years, the Heritage Foundation has eagerly promoted itself as a supporter of bipartisan 
criminal justice reform—on the condition that such reform include efforts to protect white collar 
defendants from “overcriminalization.”219
Separately, the Koch brothers have thrown their weight—and financial support—behind 
various decarceration initiatives. Their interest in the criminal justice system reportedly began in 
the 1990s, when federal prosecutors pursued criminal charges against Koch Industries for 
violating environmental laws.220 The Kochs’ interest in criminal justice issues, however, extends 
beyond white-collar offenses. Since 2004, the Kochs have made annual donations to the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”) that have addressed issues including 
indigent legal defense and “ban the box” initiatives for people attempting to find jobs after being 
released from prison.221 And since February 2015, when Koch Industries committed more than $5 
million toward the Coalition for Public Safety, a bipartisan push for federal sentencing reform, 
they have played an increasing role in left-right advocacy for decarceration.222
D. The New Bipartisanship 
1. Early Progressive Efforts to Ally with the Right 
As soon as Right on Crime launched, a handful of progressive and liberal-aligned 
advocates and criminal justice researchers (initially including the ACLU, the Brennan Center for 
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(Jan. 29, 2015), http://time.com/3686797/charles-koch-criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/455X-LC5B]. See also U.S. 
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Justice, and the Sentencing Project) and non-aligned groups like Families Against Mandatory 
Minimums (“FAMM”) and the Constitution Project, recognized that Right on Crime had opened 
the door to an effective “strange bedfellows” partnership between progressive and conservative 
criminal justice reform advocates. Vanita Gupta, who led the ACLU’s criminal justice work from 
2010 to 2014, was an early mover in cultivating ties with these conservative advocates. Under 
Gupta’s leadership, the ACLU shifted its criminal justice messaging to focus on cost savings, 
efficiency, and other ideas that appeal to conservatives. For example, a 2011 ACLU document 
laying out the organization’s critique of mass incarceration emphasized that “in order for our 
system to do a good job, it must be cost-effective by using our taxpayer dollars and public 
resources wisely” and concluded with the statement, “It’s time to improve our criminal justice 
system by making it more cost-effective and fair.”223
Other progressive advocates soon pursued the same strategy. The NAACP’s Ben Jealous 
launched a “Smart and Safe” criminal justice reform campaign in 2011 alongside David Keene, 
Grover Norquist, and other Right on Crime members.224 The Drug Policy Alliance later joined the 
roster of progressive organizations in the #Cut50 partnership.225 Most recently, the Koch-affiliated 
bipartisan Coalition for Public Safety has brought together the ACLU, Center for American 
Progress, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, and the NAACP with a range of 
conservative groups including Americans for Tax Reform, Faith and Freedom Coalition, 
FreedomWorks, and Right on Crime.226 By the time President Obama tapped Gupta to lead the 
Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice in October 2014, conservative advocates 
identified her as a trusted partner.227
The decision of Gupta, Jealous, and other progressive advocates to ally with the right 
was politically savvy and the correct choice for the time. When Right on Crime first launched, an 
accusation of being “soft on crime” was still dangerous for politicians.228 And despite some signs 
that state government austerity measures forced by the 2008 fiscal crisis had created an opening 
for criminal justice reform,229 the risk of retrenchment was high. In April 2011, for example, 
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http://nymag.com/news/frank-rich/michael-dukakis-2012-6/ [https://perma.cc/LKS2-L6KS]. 
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Practices, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 13, (July 2009), http://www.vera.org/files/The-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections_July-
2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/S33X-UZ65] (examining recession-driven changes to corrections policies, including 
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California’s Democratic governor and a Democratic majority of the state legislature responded to 
the Supreme Court’s prison overcrowding order in Brown v. Plata230 with a timid plan that one 
commentator described as being developed by “all the stakeholders except for prisoners and their 
advocates.”231 Rather than adopting sentencing reforms or directly releasing people from prison, 
this “realignment” plan shifted large numbers of prisoners to county custody and had the 
unfortunate effect of triggering not widespread decarceration, but a combination of jail 
overcrowding and new jail construction.232 Meanwhile, California’s Republican legislators 
engaged in familiar fear-mongering and actually called for harsher sentencing laws.233 In October 
2011, Gallup concluded that despite a sharp decline in the violent crime rate since the mid-1990s, 
Americans’ perceptions of crime had “edged back to a more highly negative outlook,” with a 
majority of respondents saying “the nation’s crime problem is extremely or very serious” and 
two-thirds saying “it is getting worse.”234 Moreover, as state tax revenues rebounded from the 
recession, this reduced the fiscal pressure to decarcerate. 
In this tough environment, Gupta and other progressive advocates who built ties with the 
right helped convert criminal justice reform from a pie-in-the-sky dream to an idea that was taken 
seriously in both liberal and deeply conservative circles. Meanwhile, the Justice Reinvestment 
Initiative (“JRI”), which began in 2002 and is funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, provided a model for identifying and adopting bipartisan reforms.  
JRI bills itself as “a data-driven approach to improve public safety, reduce corrections and related 
criminal justice spending, and reinvest savings in strategies that can decrease crime and reduce 
recidivism.”235 By the end of 2011, states as varied as Texas, South Carolina, Kentucky, Arkansas, 
Ohio, and Connecticut had adopted bipartisan criminal justice reforms that promised to reduce 
prison populations.236 By early 2013, criminal justice reform ideas had become part of the 
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Republican mainstream and were touted at the annual CPAC conference.237 And in 2013, the U.S. 
Department of Justice announced new initiatives like its “Smart on Crime” effort to prioritize 
federal prosecutions for certain categories of more serious cases, limit sentences for low-level 
nonviolent drug offenses, pursue alternatives to incarceration for low-level nonviolent offenses, 
focus more attention to reentry, and reallocate resources to focus on violence prevention.238 In 
announcing this policy initiative, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder explicitly repudiated the 
further growth of mass incarceration in bold terms: “‘We must face the reality that, as it stands, 
our system is, in too many ways, broken,’” Holder said. ‘And with an outsized, unnecessarily 
large prison population, we need to ensure that incarceration is used to punish, to deter and to 
rehabilitate—not merely to warehouse and to forget.’”239 And in November 2014, California 
voters approved a ballot measure that adopted more significant sentencing reforms than anything 
their legislators were able to agree upon.240
2. More Recent Reform Efforts and the Limits of the Left-Right Alliance 
Since 2014, the new bipartisan criminal justice reform alliance has continued to 
accelerate. In March 2015, a bipartisan summit sponsored by individuals and organizations across 
the ideological spectrum—ranging from Newt Gingrich and the Koch brothers to Van Jones and 
the ACLU—discussed the immediate need for criminal justice reform.241 In November 2015, the 
Koch Institute hosted a conference of some 500 advocates, public defenders, prosecutors, judges, 
correctional officers, former prisoners, and others to discuss a “transideological” agenda for 
criminal justice reform.242  In Congress, bipartisan sentencing reform measures made significant 
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progress in 2015. This included the CORRECTIONS Act, S.467 and the Smarter Sentencing Act 
of 2015, S.502, both of which had broad bipartisan support and sought to reduce a wide range of 
drug sentences.243 A somewhat less ambitious bill giving courts more discretion to reduce drug 
sentences even won the blessing of U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley, a longtime proponent of harsh 
mandatory-minimum sentencing regimes.244
This progress has, however, exposed some of the limits of such consensus-driven, 
bipartisan criminal justice reform and raised concerns about whether liberal and conservative 
goals are truly aligned.245 JRI’s outcomes represent an early warning sign of the limits of 
consensus-driven reform. The JRI model depends on a bipartisan working group of government 
officials to analyze data, develop policy options based on a consensus within the working group 
members, and implement them.246 By 2013, however, a group of leading researchers, analysts, and 
advocates concluded that the initiative had generally failed to reduce prison populations in JRI 
states and risked institutionalizing present rates of incarceration: “If the goal [of JRI] is to reduce 
mass incarceration, there is scant evidence of success. More alarming, there is little indication that 
historic rates of incarceration will be reduced in the future.”247 They attributed this failure to a 
shift in JRI’s goals and orientation, driven in part by the need to win support and consensus for 
JRI among a wide range of legislators and other public officials.248 The data in the Urban 
Institute’s 2014 evaluation of JRI gave credence to this critique. Of the 17 JRI states, seven are 
expected to experience prison population growth despite JRI reforms, six are expected to 
experience modest drops in prison population of between 0.6% and 8%, and only four are 
expected to experience larger drops in prison population (i.e., 10% or more).249 Such single-
percentage changes are too small to significantly affect, let alone end, mass incarceration.250
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JRI’s disappointing results are partly attributable to politically timid decisions to focus 
entirely on cutting sentences for low-level, nonviolent drug offenses without reexamining 
sentences for more serious or violent offenses—something for which both liberals and 
conservatives share the blame.251 Liberals, in particular, tend to grossly overestimate the modest 
impact that reducing sentences for nonviolent drug offenses would have on prison populations.252
However, JRI’s limited results are also attributable to decisions that reflect deeper left-right 
divides: in particular, shifting averted correctional spending mainly to other correctional programs 
rather than—as the left advocates, and as JRI initially contemplated—reinvesting that money in 
community institutions.253 Moreover, the JRI process allows “reforms” that actually contribute to 
economic inequalities: Arkansas’ JRI legislation, for example, increased the fees charged to 
people on criminal justice supervision by 40% to support the state’s “Best Practices Fund.”254 JRI 
documents also carefully avoid linking racial justice issues to criminal justice reform.255
These left-right fissures will only become more difficult to ignore as time goes on. The 
conflict over whether to address racial justice concerns is already obvious.256 Additionally, many 
on the left—particularly within the Black Lives Matter movement—explicitly reject the notion 
that funding corrections and law enforcement programs is equivalent to community 
reinvestment.257 There is considerable support on the left for government investments in low-
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income housing, employment, health care, and community-based mental health treatment that 
could address the root causes of crime and social disorder—but little such agreement on the 
right.258
Many in the left also harbor suspicions about the motives of conservative criminal justice 
reform advocates. The Koch brothers and the Heritage Foundation frequently claim that 
companies and businesspeople are “overcriminalized” and need protection from white-collar 
regulatory offenses with loose mens rea requirements.259 As a result, some have accused 
conservatives of using criminal justice reform as a “Trojan Horse” to advance corporate interests 
and weaken environmental regulations.260 The conflict came to a head in late 2015 and early 2016, 
when Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Rep. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) insisted that any bipartisan 
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[https://perma.cc/68LX-CGJV]; Anthony Romero, Letter to the Editor, Criminal Justice Reforms, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 
2016), http://nyti.ms/1QluxW1 [https://perma.cc/8JEW-38TV]; Letter from Wade Henderson & Nancy Zirkin, The 
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, to Members of Senate Judiciary Committee (June 19, 2016), 
https://justiceroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Letter-on-Mens-Rea-Reform-Act-of-2015-1-19-16-Senate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GJ7T-EZMP].
260  Matt Apuzzo & Eric Lipton, Rare White House Accord with Koch Brothers on Sentencing Frays, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1IaQof6 [https://perma.cc/EN2R-ZRTZ]; Zach Carter, Kochs Embedded In Major 
Rift On Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 25, 2015), http://huff.to/1p1KJQ1 
[https://perma.cc/5T48-ADE6]; Dan Froomkin, Koch “Alliance” on Criminal Justice Reform Exposed as Trojan Horse,
THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 25, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/11/25/koch-alliance-on-criminal-justice-reform-exposed-
as-trojan-horse/ [https://perma.cc/95MR-BPER]; Lee Fang, Koch Brothers Talk Criminal Justice Reform, but Pay for 
“Tough on Crime” Political Ads, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 3, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/11/03/soft-on-crime-ads/ 
[https://perma.cc/9V4E-GJJF]. See also Katy Reckdahl, “We Agree on the Bigger Issue,” THE CRIME REPORT
(Nov. 6, 2015), http://www.thecrimereport.org/news/inside-criminal-justice/2015-11-we-agree-on-the-bigger-issue
[https://perma.cc/9V4E-GJJF].
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criminal justice legislation must include provisions that stiffen mens rea requirements for white-
collar crimes.261
For their part, conservatives are wary of Black Lives Matter,262 and continue to have 
serious disagreements with progressives about what to do with the money saved by reducing 
incarceration levels. Many times, they simply tout the cost savings without any mention of 
reinvesting it in anything.263 Other times, they emphasize reinvesting the money in crime control, 
rather than building positive institutions.264
III. THE NIGHTMARE FUTURE OF MASS CONTROL AND A NEW  
PARADIGM OF MASS INCARCERATION 
The left is not lacking for vision. The Black Lives Matter movement, the growing 
network of grassroots organizations built by formerly incarcerated people, and other elements of 
the left are each defining goals for how to build principles of racial justice, community 
participation, and human value into a decarcerated future.265 Other progressive advocates must 
actively incorporate these principles into our own advocacy rather than letting everything be 
framed by the right-left alliance. Decarceration that is not grounded in such a vision, and that 
relies primarily or solely on the left-right alliance for its rhetoric and implementation, will 
naturally slide into serving the right’s interests—and this slide could ultimately foreclose the 
future that the left hopes to create. 
The following section describes the inherent limits of the left-right alliance, and how 
those limits will combine with the interests of for-profit prison companies and other carceral 
profiteers. If progressive advocates are not careful, the left-right alliance will lead to decarceration 
that is dominated by cost-cutting rather than a desire to reduce the overall size of the criminal 
justice system, which will in turn replace mass incarceration with an even larger carceral state, 
characterized by for-profit mass control. That system of for-profit mass control will in turn set the 
stage for a final nightmare: a return to mass incarceration in an even more tenacious form. 
                                                                  
261  Mike DeBonis, The issue that could keep Congress from passing criminal justice reform, WASH. POST
(Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/01/20/the-issue-that-could-keep-congress-
from-passing-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/62DS-B4TR]. Interestingly, the Kochs themselves broke with 
their supporters and indicated that they would still support a criminal justice reform bill that did not include mens rea
reform. Id.
262 See Sabrina Siddiqui, Republicans ‘Cautious’ About Confronting Black Lives Matter on Campaign 
Trail, GUARDIAN (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/nov/02/black-lives-matter-republicans-
democrats-2016 [https://perma.cc/7TZP-FKVP].
263 See, e.g., Andrew Gargano, Federal Sentencing Reform Can Reduce Prison Crowding and Save Money,
THE HILL BLOG (April 29, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/240340-federal-sentencing-
reform-can-reduce-prison-crowding-and-save [https://perma.cc/3DSR-LDA5], Gingrich & Nolan, supra note 209. 
264 See, e.g., VIKRANT REDDY, CONSERVATIVE REFORM NETWORK, ROOM TO GROW SERIES: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM, A NEW AGENDA FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 20 (2015), http://conservativereform.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/CriminalJusticeReform_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CFU-GSZY] (savings from reduced 
incarceration should be reinvested in prisons that reduce recividism); Richard Viguerie, A Conservative Case for Prison 
Reform, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/opinion/a-conservative-case-for-prison-
reform.html [https://perma.cc/G7DZ-DVET] (arguing for savings to be reinvested in alternative punishments). 
265 See supra Section II.B.
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A. Conservative Decarceration 
The right’s push to decarcerate comes from three main sources: fiscal conservatives, 
libertarians, and religious conservatives. For fiscal conservatives, the chief goal of decarceration 
is to reduce the costs to the government associated with incarceration.266 In many cases, fiscal 
conservatives who support decarceration chide their fellow conservatives for failing to look at 
prosecutors and prisons with the same distrust that they apply to other government functions, such 
as social welfare programs. Grover Norquist puts it this way: “Today’s criminal justice system is 
big government on steroids, and the responsibility for taming its excesses falls to those committed 
to smaller government: conservatives.”267 The fiscal conservative push to close prisons is not 
about safeguarding personal autonomy; instead, they are comfortable with applying coercive 
methods of control and supervision to large populations as long as such coercion achieves short-
term behavior modification and is less expensive than incarceration.268 Fiscal conservatives 
frequently endorse privatization as a way of making the criminal justice system more efficient.269
Additionally, they tend to emphasize limited narratives of holding individuals accountable, rather 
than examining the broader social structures that funnel people into criminal justice 
involvement.270
                                                                  
266 See, e.g., Jon Coupal & Leonard Gilroy, Opinion, Cutting Costs for State Prisons, ORANGE COUNTY
REG. (Apr. 8, 2010), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/state-243090-prisons-california.html [https://perma.cc/BXW9-
72ZF]; Newt Gingrich & B. Wayne Hughes, Jr., Opinion, What California Can Learn from the Red States on Crime and 
Punishment, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2014, 5:27 p.m.), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0917-gingrich-prop—
47-criminal-justice-20140917-story.html [https://perma.cc/S26Z-9H6V]; Jerry Madden, Opinion, Texas Criminal Justice 
Reform a Model for U.S., WASH. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/17/madden-
texas-criminal-justice-reform-model-us/ [https://perma.cc/H3TE-6XKA]. 
267  Grover Norquist, Opinion, Conservatives Must Police Bottom Line on Criminal Justice, ORANGE
COUNTY REG. (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/prison-288870-government-criminal.html [https:// 
perma.cc/B7CF-WTWQ]. 
268 See, e.g., Vikrant P. Reddy & Marc A. Levin, The Conservative Case Against More Prisons, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-conservative-case-against-more-
prisons/ [https://perma.cc/DKV2-XVKX] (advocating use of electronic monitoring and specialized institutions like 
Hawaii’s “HOPE” court, which requires supervisees to call the court each day to find out whether they have been 
randomly selected to report to court the same day to take a drug test, without regard for job scheduling or other demands 
on the supervisee’s time); Viguerie, supra note 264 (“The solution lies not only inside prisons but also with more effective 
community supervision systems using new technologies, drug tests and counseling programs. We should also require ex-
convicts to either hold a job or perform community service.”). 
269 See Leonard Gilroy & Adrian Moore, Why Bernie Sanders is Wrong About Private Prisons,
REASON (Sept. 29, 2015), http://reason.com/archives/2015/09/29/why-bernie-sanders-is-wrong-about-privat
[https://perma.cc/HP3T-45BQ] (arguing that private prison contracts offer more vehicles for accountability than 
government-run prisons); Rachel Lu, How Conservatives Are Getting Right on Crime, FEDERALIST, (Feb. 3, 2015), 
http://thefederalist.com/
2015/02/03/how-conservatives-are-getting-right-on-crime/ [https://perma.cc/6XUZ-AJGX] (“Private prisons may be a 
promising alternative to state or federally-run prisons, since they can be more easily incentivized to explore evidence-
based methods for diminishing recidivism.”); Leonard C. Gilroy et. al., Public-Private Partnerships for Corrections in 
California: Bridging the Gap Between Crisis and Reform, REASON FDN. & HOWARD JARVIS TAXPAYERS ASSN. 33-34
(Apr. 2010, rev. Apr. 2011) http://reason.org/files/private_prisons_california.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YNX-N27P] (arguing 
that California should address prison overcrowding by signing private prison contracts).  
270 See Lu, supra note 269 (“We value personal responsibility. Individuals should be held accountable for 
what they do, regardless of their childhood. Accountability is essential to justice, but also to moral improvement.”); Reddy 
& Levin, supra note 268 (“[J]ust as policymakers should scrutinize government expenditures on social programs and 
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For libertarians, the motivation to decarcerate stems from a general hostility to 
government powers and large bureaucracies. In certain powerful respects, this intersects with the 
left’s concern about police and prosecutorial abuses of power.271 However, the libertarian critique 
is equally suspicious of institutions like a social safety net, community medical and mental health 
care, and anti-poverty programs that could carry out the functions presently performed (albeit 
poorly) by the carceral state.272 Taken together, these positions suggest that rather than fill the  
void created by prison closures, libertarians would prefer to live in a country that maximizes 
individual freedom for those with the means to enjoy it, while offering little assistance or comfort 
to the rest. 
Meanwhile, religious conservatives view decarceration through a moral lens. They 
believe that rather than attempting to mete out increasingly severe punishments, the criminal 
justice system should save people from being defined solely by their worst moments, offer second 
chances, and seek to redeem criminals in the same way that converting to evangelical Christianity 
redeems sinners.273 While this vision is in many ways more compatible with progressive visions 
of justice than the fiscal conservative or libertarian visions, it is not identical. In particular, the 
conservative worldview strongly emphasizes individual narratives of redemption and a focus on 
religious community over broad notions of social justice.274 This focus tends to ignore or gloss 
over the central elements of the New Jim Crow critique and the Black Lives Matter movement.  
                                                                  
demand accountability, they should do the same when it comes to prison spending.”). 
271 See generally Radley Balko, Overkill: The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America, CATO
INSTITUTE (2006) http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/balko_whitepaper_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/H299-
P8NB] (criticizing police militarization); Terrance G. Reed, American Forfeiture Laws: Property Owners Meet the 
Prosecutor, CATO INSTITUTE (Sept. 29, 1992), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa179.pdf
[https://perma.cc/95XE-DNM8] (criticizing asset forfeiture by police and prosecutors); Steven Wisotsky, A Society of 
Suspects: The War on Drugs and Civil Liberties, CATO INSTITUTE (Oct. 2, 1992), http://object.cato.org/sites/ 
cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa180.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NXT-FVU8] (warning of War on Drugs infringing on civil liberties). 
272 See generally Kent Masterson Brown, The Freedom to Spend Your Own Money on Medical Care: A 
Common Casualty of Universal Coverage, CATO INSTITUTE (Oct. 15, 2007), http://object.cato.org/ 
sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa601.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z57Z-NQJW] (criticizing universal health care coverage for 
limiting the “unfettered right” to spend one’s own money on health care); Tad DeHaven, The Rising Cost of Social  
Security Disability Insurance, CATO INSTITUTE (Aug. 6, 2013), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
pubs/pdf/pa733_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/46HT-4464] (calling for cuts to disability insurance); Jeffrey A. Schaler, 
Strategies of Psychiatric Coercion, CATO UNBOUND (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/08/06/jeffrey-
schaler/strategies-psychiatric-coercion [https://perma.cc/R3JS-SCSB] (opposing a public health approach to mental 
illness); Michael Tanner, The American Welfare State: How We Spend Nearly $1 Trillion a Year Fighting Poverty—and 
Fail, CATO INSTITUTE, (Apr. 11, 2012), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA694.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
BXR2-H722] (criticizing welfare programs). 
273 See, e.g., Galen Carey, An Evangelical Perspective on Criminal Justice Reform, NAT’L ASSOC. OF 
EVANGELICALS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://nae.net/an-evangelical-perspective-on-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/ 
USS8-7K8N] (“When we see prisoners as fellow human beings made in God’s image, we can no longer just lock them up 
and throw away the key.”); Mike Lee, Opinion, The Conservative Case for Criminal Justice Reform, FEDERALIST
(Oct. 7, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/10/07/the-conservative-case-for-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/ 
JSY6-YXKC] (using Christian rhetoric of forgiveness and second chances). 
274 See, e.g., Carey, supra note 273 (emphasizing role of chaplains, volunteers, and community groups); 
Lee, supra note 273 (criticizing “government-run or government-funded correctional institutions” and praising religious 
community institutions). 
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Additionally, their focus on private charity over public action leaves little role for the government 
in addressing root causes of crime such as poverty, residential segregation and the accompanying 
community underinvestment, and lack of job opportunities.275
There are three chief problems with allowing any of these conservative, anti-government, 
individual-focused worldviews to drive how decarceration proceeds: (1) they fail to address the 
racial disparities in the criminal justice system; (2) they fail to address the underlying social 
problems that trap people in a cycle of criminal justice involvement; and (3) they exhibit a 
preference for replacing government programs with private entities, in both the criminal justice 
system and other contexts. 
Reducing the total number of people incarcerated will not automatically reduce the racial 
disparities in who gets arrested, prosecuted, and sentenced to prison. Indeed, recent experience 
suggests that a decarceration strategy that does not explicitly address these disparities may 
actually make them worse. Minnesota has one of the lowest incarceration rates in the country, but 
has some of the greatest racial disparities in incarceration, probably because of wealth disparities 
between Black and white Minnesotans.276 Similarly, when New York City announced that NYPD 
would shift away from arrests and toward issuing summonses for marijuana possession, arrest 
rates fell across the city but summonses were issued far more frequently in Black and Latino 
neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods—a situation that Vice News described thusly: “Weed 
Is Basically Legal in New York City Now, but Only If You’re White.”277 Accordingly, adopting a 
conservative, raceblind decarceration strategy means that the burdens of the criminal justice 
system will continue to fall overwhelmingly and disproportionately on impoverished communities 
of color. Rather than becoming truly liberated, these communities will continue to be subjected to 
what Michelle Alexander describes as a racialized caste system or system of social control—
albeit in a different form than today. Some would argue that having large numbers of people 
under supervision in communities of color is better than having large numbers of people removed 
from these communities through incarceration. But as Black Lives Matter activists have so 
effectively argued since the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown, the racially disparate application of 
police violence and other forms of social control is itself a serious societal harm that impedes the 
full participation of Black people in civic life.278 Moreover, as discussed supra, supervision all too 
often serves as a path back into incarceration. 
                                                                  
275 See Mark Oppenheimer, With Prison Ministry, Colson Linked Religion and Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
27, 2012), http://nyti.ms/20TM4Ef [https://perma.cc/6PMX-YF6W].  
276  GOTTSCHALK, supra note 7, at 133. See also JONATHAN M. ROSE, COUNCIL ON BLACK MINNESOTANS,
DISPARITY ANALYSIS: A REVIEW OF DISPARITIES BETWEEN WHITE MINNESOTANS AND OTHER RACIAL GROUPS (2013), 
http://mn.gov/cobm/pdf/COBM%20-%202013%20Research%20Report%20on%20Disparities.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P6B-
Y2H5] (describing Black-white economic, educational, and other disparities in Minnesota). 
277  Theodore Hamm & Alex S. Vitale, Weed Is Basically Legal in New York City Now, but Only If You’re 
White, VICE (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.vice.com/read/weed-is-basically-legal-in-new-york-city-now-but-only-if-youre-
white-1023 [https://perma.cc/KJW4-6SGY].  
278 See, e.g., Mychal Denzel Smith, A Q&A With Opal Tometi, Co-Founder of #BlackLivesMatter, THE
NATION (June 2, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/qa-opal-tometi-co-founder-blacklivesmatter/ [https://perma.cc/ 
P9ZK-ZJ76]; Mychal Denzel Smith, A Q&A With Alicia Garza, Co-Founder of #BlackLivesMatter, THE NATION (Mar. 
24, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/qa-alicia-garza-co-founder-blacklivesmatter/ [https://perma.cc/5KQS-JGRJ]; 
Van R. Newkirk II, The Permanence of Black Lives Matter, THE ATLANTIC (August 3, 2015) http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2016/08/movement-black-lives-platform/494309/ [https://perma.cc/R5EY-HNRC]. See also Ta-Nehisi
Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, THE ATLANTIC (October 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-family-in-the-age-of-mass-incarceration/403246/ [https://perma.cc/A4TK-SF5J]. 
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Similarly, failing to address the underlying social problems and community 
underinvestment that trap people in a cycle of criminal justice involvement will prevent these 
individuals from being able to escape future involvement in that system. As Marie Gottschalk has 
written, “The terms reentry, rehabilitation, and ‘second chance’ are gross misnomers . . . many 
former offenders never got a first chance, let alone a second one.”279 Decarceration that prioritizes 
cost-cutting and rugged individualism will fail to address the structural causes of crime, such as 
poverty, lack of quality formal education, lack of living-wage job opportunities, lack of wealth, 
social exclusion, unaddressed mental health issues, and drug addiction.280
Thus, in a conservative-driven decarceration, the criminal justice system will continue to 
serve as society’s main response to the unmet needs of these populations. And many 
conservatives believe that components of the criminal justice system can operate fairly and 
efficiently if delegated to private entities. This pro-privatization bias is where the nightmare 
begins.
B. Private Interests Move In, and the Net Widens 
Consistent with the principles described above, the criminal justice reform proposals that 
have emerged from recent bipartisan alliances tend to focus exclusively on decarceration without 
attempting to reduce the broad net cast by the criminal justice system generally. For example, the 
major criminal justice reform bill introduced with bipartisan congressional support in 2015—the 
CORRECTIONS Act (S.467), the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015 (S.502), and Sentencing 
Reform and Corrections Act of 2015 (S.2123)—focused on reducing mandatory minimum 
sentences and, in the case of the CORRECTIONS Act, increasing the use of home confinement 
and community supervision.281 Similarly, criminal justice reform legislation sponsored by the 
Pew/BJA JRI often functioned by shifting certain populations from prisons into supervision 
programs like parole and probation.282 And in general, politicians calling for sentencing reform 
tend to link less use of prison to greater use of supervision. There are two risks associated with 
such proposals. First, the incentives they create for prosecutors may inadvertently result in net-
widening by shifting people onto more intensive supervision regimes than those people may have  
                                                                  
279  GOTTSCHALK, supra note 7, at 81. 
280 See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 7, at 79-97 (arguing that narrowly focusing on reentry as a path out of the 
carceral state ignores the deeper structural issues and political economy on which the carceral state rests). 
281 See CORRECTIONS Act, S. 467, 114th Cong. (2015); Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015, S. 502, 114th 
Cong. (2015); Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S.2123, 114th Cong. (2015). 
282 See URBAN INSTITUTE JRI ASSESSMENT, supra note 246, at 74 (Kansas JRI reforms involved strong 
emphasis on community corrections, including requiring post-release supervision for individuals reincarcerated for 
probation revocations); 23, 78 (Kentucky JRI reforms included increasing GPS monitoring and other alternative sanctions 
for low-level, nonviolent offenses); 82 (Louisiana JRI reforms focused on expansion of early release and parole for people 
in prison); 90 (New Hampshire JRI reforms focused on increasing use of parole); 24, 94 (North Carolina JRI reforms 
focused on reducing prison sentences, creating an option for an early shift from prison to supervision, increasing the length 
of post-incarceration supervision for serious offenses, and shifting misdemeanants from prison to jail or probation); 23, 98 
(Ohio JRI reforms included making greater use of community corrections, requiring GPS monitoring for certain people 
released from prison, and increasing probation options); 102 (Oklahoma JRI reforms included requiring supervision after 
release from prison); 122 (West Virginia JRI reforms included mandatory supervision for all felony offenders). 
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otherwise received.283 Second, they create opportunities for rent-seeking by companies that profit 
from reentry and supervision services. 
As described supra, the two major private prison companies have already begun to 
acquire community corrections facilities and electronic monitoring firms.284 If bipartisan criminal 
justice reform efforts result in a large-scale shift from incarceration to community corrections and 
supervision, the now-diversified private prison companies will be poised to capture that business. 
As one GEO executive put it on a recent earnings call, “We believe that the emphasis on offender 
rehabilitation and community reentry programs as part of criminal justice reform will create 
growth opportunities for our company.”285 Additionally, privatized probation firms represent a 
natural acquisition target for CCA/CoreCivic and GEO in the coming years—particularly for 
GEO, which already has a GPS monitoring subsidiary with complementary capabilities. If such 
acquisitions are completed, then in certain states, the two companies could achieve vertically 
integrated control over every non-judicial step in the criminal justice system, from pretrial 
supervision to incarceration to community corrections to probation and parole supervision. 
This vertical integration would incentivize CCA/CoreCivic and GEO not just to keep 
people in prison, but to keep people involved in the criminal justice system generally, whether 
through expanding the populations subject to probation, extending probation terms, or returning  
people to prison through probation revocations. For any individual who enters such a vertically-
integrated system, there is only one outcome that would not feed corporate revenue: a successful 
exit from the criminal justice system. 
Additionally, because supervision is cheaper on a per-person basis than incarceration, 
any shift from prisons to supervision would tend to incentivize these companies to boost revenue 
by widening the net of criminal justice system involvement. Statistics compiled by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts indicate that incarcerating a person in a federal prison 
costs $30,621 per year, while keeping a person on post-sentencing community supervision costs 
$3,909 per year.286 Thus, assuming that both activities yield the same 10% profit margin,287 a 
private prison company would have to keep more than 7,800 people on probation for a year to 
make the same profits that they would have made from incarcerating 1,000 people for a year. 
Indeed, even without vertical integration, private probation firms are incentivized to 
widen the net of people on supervision and keep people on supervision rather than allow them to 
                                                                  
283 See DON STEMEN & ANDRES F. RENGIFO, NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., ALTERNATIVE
SENTENCING POLICIES FOR DRUG OFFENDERS: EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF KANSAS SENATE BILL 123, FINAL
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284 See supra text accompanying notes 152-159. 
285 The GEO Group’s (GEO) CEO George Zoley on Q3 2015 Results - Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING
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results-earnings-call-transcript?part=single [https://perma.cc/PQ6W-VJR5].  
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(June 18, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2015/06/18/did-you-know-imprisonment-costs-8-times-more-supervision
[https://perma.cc/S547-ZA8T].
287  In 2014, CCA/CoreCivic’s gross revenue was $1,646,867 and its net income was $195,022, yielding a 
profit margin of 11.8%. See CXW Income Statement, supra note 122. Similarly, GEO’s gross revenue was $1,691,620 and 
its net income was $143,930, yielding a profit margin of 8.5%. See GEO Income Statement, supra note 122. Thus, a 10% 
profit margin is a fair ballpark estimate. 
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successfully complete it. This dynamic has already been documented in the private, for-profit 
probation firms that operate in Georgia. Thanks to the existence of private probation companies, 
many people who would not otherwise be on probation are placed on indeterminate sentences of 
“pay only” probation solely to pay off outstanding court fines and fees.288 The longer it takes for a  
person to pay off the underlying court debt, the more fees the probation company collects—and 
HRW documented multiple instances of people being trapped in pay-only probation arrangements 
for years after being convicted.289
C. Mass Control Supplants Mass Incarceration 
Fueled by these incentives, it is likely that a successful left-right alliance to end mass 
incarceration would rearrange the carceral state rather than shrinking it—replacing the paradigm 
of mass incarceration with a new paradigm of mass control. Take, for example, the 50% reduction 
in the prison population that has been set as a goal by Van Jones’ #cut50 alliance.290 If successful, 
this effort would result in widespread prison closures. However, replacing half of all prison 
sentences with equivalent terms of supervision would increase the supervision population to 
nearly 5.5 million people.291
Closing prisons and replacing them with mass control would carry obvious appeal for 
fiscal conservatives, given the lower per-person costs of mass control. Viewed through the lens of 
racial justice, however, the results would be decidedly less impressive. Black and Brown people 
would continue to be arrested and prosecuted at rates far out of proportion to their numbers in the 
population.292 And even with fewer people in prison, pervasive supervision would further harm 
impoverished Black and Brown communities.293
Under a mass control paradigm, young Black men and women would remain in the 
community but be marked and tracked by the criminal justice system—perhaps with the literal 
shackle of an electronic ankle monitor, or perhaps with the invisible but pervasive eye of 
probation and parole supervision. Indeed, in neighborhoods where most young Black men are 
subject to the diminished rights of probation and parole supervision, police tactics could further 
escalate in aggressiveness and intrusiveness on the streets, in houses, and in businesses and places 
of worship without running afoul of any legal boundaries. Given the extremely limited Fourth 
Amendment rights of people on probation and parole, this could go far beyond the already 
                                                                  
288  PROFITING FROM PROBATION, supra note 5, at 25-27. 
289 Id. at 29. 
290 See Our Mission & Work, #CUT50, http://www.cut50.org/mission [https://perma.cc/F49A-P26E] (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2016). 
291 See Kaeble & Bonczar, supra note 51, at 1 (approximately 4.65 million people on community 
supervision at year-end 2015); PRISONERS IN 2015, supra note 9, at 2, tbl. 1 (approximately 1.53 million people in prison 
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292 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS
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293  In fact, making greater use of supervision could worsen the racial disparities in who is incarcerated and 
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significant intrusions justified under stop-and-frisk policies.294 A recent proposal by Washington, 
D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser to crack down on probationers and parolees illustrates what kinds of 
powers could be unleashed on Black and Brown communities: police empowered to carry out 
random searches of supervisees at any time of the day or night, and granted discretion to 
immediately jail people for up to 72 hours in response to minor infractions of conditions of 
supervision.295 The more people who are on supervision in any given community, the more 
confident that police officers would be in freely conducting suspicionless body searches of 
random people on the streets, warrantless house raids, and mass sweeps in local stores, churches, 
and other places where people on supervision would congregate. The situation for Black people in 
these neighborhoods is already bad enough when police are not legally privileged to engage in 
such abuse—as Black Lives Matter has so persistently highlighted since the movement began. But 
mass control would make it even worse. 
Mass control would be similarly distressing from an economic justice perspective. 
Instead of addressing issues of concentrated poverty and disenfranchisement, it would expand the 
number of people burdened with criminal records. Research shows that having a criminal 
record—even one that did not result in prison time—can lead to serious barriers in seeking 
employment, housing, public assistance, and education and training.296 Being arrested during 
one’s lifetime decreases employment opportunities more than long-term unemployment, receipt 
of public assistance, or having a GED instead of a high school diploma.297 Additionally, like the 
current systems of privatized probation and privatized electronic monitoring, the new mass 
control measures would probably be financed on the backs of those supervised. They would thus 
perpetuate a two-tiered system of justice, in which people of financial means can complete their 
terms of supervision within the originally allotted time, but poor people would be subject to 
longer periods of supervision to pay off their supervision debts (and thereby further add to those 
debts) and likely be subject to the same kinds of high fees and debtors’ prison collection practices 
that already characterize criminal justice debt collection in many jurisdictions. 
Mass control would also be distressing from a good-government perspective. Based on 
our three decades of experience with private prison companies, we should expect similar 
problems of performance, accountability, and transparency from privatized reentry and 
supervision.298 Indeed, the abuses documented in the nascent private probation industry—a “user-
                                                                  
294 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (upholding police officer’s suspicionless and 
warrantless search of parolee); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2001) (warrantless police search of 
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to his probation officer’s efforts to monitor probation compliance); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876-88 (1987) 
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policies).
295 See Aaron C. Davis & Peter Hermann, D.C. Mayor to Ask for Expanded Police Powers Amid Homicide 
Spike, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-mayor-to-ask-for- 
expanded-police-powers-amid-homicide-spike/2015/08/25/f7e57656-4b64-11e5-84df-923b3ef1a64b_story.html?utm-
term=.3976ba4fce5c [https://perma.cc/NKH8-48SQ].
296 See REBECCA VALLAS & SHARON DIETRICH, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, ONE STRIKE AND 
YOU’RE OUT: HOW WE CAN ELIMINATE BARRIERS TO ECONOMIC SECURITY AND MOBILITY FOR PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL
RECORDS, 9-28 (Dec. 2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/VallasCriminalRecordsReport.
pdf [https://perma.cc/G32A-EW5T].  
297 Id. at 9. 
298 See supra Section I.D. (discussing private prison industry). 
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funded” model kept afloat by abusive debt collection and unnecessary requirements imposed by 
private probation officers that increase corporate revenue—suggest the new types of profit-driven 
abuses that will come from privatized mass control.299
The most worrisome aspect of mass control is, however, the ease with which it could 
pave the way to new and even worse form of mass incarceration. 
D. Prisons Expand Once Again—But Now with an Entrenched Privatized Apparatus of 
Mass Control, Surveillance, and Monitoring 
If cost-based decarceration is successful at effecting a large-scale shift of people from 
incarceration to supervision, we will know it from the prison closures. Rendered obsolete by the 
new mass control paradigm, many of these expensive, heavily-staffed public institutions will shut 
down—maybe converted into museums like Alcatraz300 and Eastern State Penitentiary,301 maybe 
converted into hotels or condos like Boston’s Charles Street Jail302 or Washington DC’s Lorton 
Reformatory,303 or maybe simply left to rot.304
One might think these constraints on prison capacity would create a natural barrier to 
putting more people in prison again: there would simply not be enough prison space to safely 
incarcerate as many people as before. However, rapid growth in the incarcerated population that 
outstripped public prison capacity is exactly what fostered the birth of the private prison industry 
in the 1980s. As a 2001 report funded by the U.S. Department of Justice put it, “the pressure of 
increased incarceration rates, combined with rising correctional costs” enabled the rise of private 
prisons in the 1980s and 1990s largely because of “the overriding desire of many states and local 
governments to rapidly increase desperately needed prison bed capacity and to reduce prison 
operational costs.”305
As in the original prison boom, the private prison industry would benefit from its ability 
to bring new private prisons online faster and with less political hassle than building new public 
prisons. Compared to the alternative of building new public prisons—which typically requires 
voters to approve prison construction bonds and other obvious, long-term investments in mass 
incarceration—contracting with the private prison industry merely requires legislative approval to 
expand a correctional agency’s operating budget.306
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305  JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, EMERGING ISSUES ON 
PRIVATIZED PRISONS, 13 (NCJ 181249, 2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2WY-
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Unlike the original prison boom, private prison companies would additionally benefit 
from their now-substantial operating capital, the sophisticated lobbying and public relations 
infrastructure they built in the first prison boom, and their deep political connections. In 1983, 
CCA/CoreCivic was such a small, ad hoc operation that its first “prison” was actually a converted 
motel that the company hurriedly leased and fenced to fulfill the terms of their first contract for 
immigrant detention.307 Thirty-three years later, CCA/CoreCivic has grown into a frighteningly 
large and sophisticated publicly-traded company, with 66 corrections and detention facilities 
around the country, over 5,500 acres of land, and annual revenues of $1.79 billion.308 Today, both 
CCA/CoreCivic and its chief competitor, GEO Group, have developed close relationships with 
state and federal policymakers. 
Furthermore, the private prison companies would benefit from their preexisting 
relationships with correctional agencies. In the 1980s, private prison companies were a new, 
unknown quantity for correctional officials, and contracting with them was seen as unusual.309 In a 
future of privatized mass control, private prison companies would already be longtime 
“government partners” in a range of settings thanks to their expansion into prison, community 
corrections, and supervision contracts. This would make private prisons the path of least 
resistance for correctional officials seeking to address new overcrowding. Moreover, the 
revolving door from federal and state correctional agencies would tend to reward the officials who 
play ball with the industry—as in the current environment, such officials could expect offers to 
join private prison companies as senior executives with higher salaries than those available in the 
public sector. (For example, when Harley Lappin moved from the Federal Bureau of Prisons to 
CCA/CoreCivic, his salary jumped from about $180,000 to $1.51 million.310) The industry could 
therefore be confident not only in their ability to quickly offer new prison space to these existing 
government partners, but in the willingness of correctional officials to take the industry up on 
these offers. 
As a result of these factors, any post-decarceration prison boom would likely be heavily 
privatized—much more so than the prison system is today, and probably similar to the high 
degree of privatization in ICE detention.311 As CCA/CoreCivic frequently reminds its investors,  
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only about 10% of prisons are currently privatized, leaving significant “[o]pportunity to gain 
market share” by private prison companies.312 A second prison boom would present an 
unparalleled opportunity for this “market penetration” to take place. 
A second prison boom is, of course, not inevitable. Prison populations would remain 
static or fall without increased numbers of prosecutions, longer stays in prison or jail, or increased 
numbers of people reincarcerated for violating their terms of supervision. However, mass 
privatized monitoring would enable private prison companies to affect the third factor by 
manipulating the mass control paradigm. Merely by changing their internal practices, they could 
increase rates of probation and parole violations and thereby send more people to prison. 
Probation officers have tremendous discretion to decide whether to respond formally or 
informally to minor rule violations by their supervisees, as well as to determine whether or not 
probation should be revoked in response to the violation.313 Additionally, in states with flash 
incarceration programs, probation officers can send a person to jail without judicial 
intervention.314 As Joan Petersilia observed in her comprehensive 1997 article on probation, “the 
probation population is so large that revoking even a few percent of them or revoking all those 
who are rearrested can have a dramatic impact on prison admissions.”315
This dynamic will create an enticing profit-making opportunity for vertically-integrated 
private prison companies. Probation and parole are imposed for limited periods of time—if 
someone successfully completes their term of supervision, then they will no longer be a source of 
income for the company supervising them. So, by granting a private prison company the power to 
decide whether to allow a supervisee to complete her term of supervision, extend the term of 
supervision, or convert the supervisee back into a prisoner, the state gives that company 
tremendous power to shape the demand for its own services. In non-vertically-integrated 
companies that solely provide probation supervision, these powers have already led to abuses.316
But a vertically-integrated private prison company would be able to take this one step further. 
Similar to Enron’s manipulation of energy markets in the early 2000s, the company could create a 
problem—prison overcrowding caused by increased rates of probation and parole revocation—
and then profit from “solving” that overcrowding problem by renting new prison bedspace to the 
state.317 Given the evidence that private prison companies already manipulate demand for prison 
beds, it would be surprising if they abstained from this new market manipulation opportunity.318
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Believers in privatization may respond that shifting from pure bed-day or supervision-
day compensation to a “pay-for-success” (“PFS”) model—for example, setting compensation for 
prisons or supervision regimes based on whether their populations reach certain recidivism-
reduction targets—would eliminate this kind of perverse incentive.319 However, this is a dubious 
proposition. PFS is poorly-suited to address the complex root causes of crime and social disorder, 
and efforts by investors to minimize their risk would likely influence both the metrics and the 
interventions selected in ways that would favor their interests over good policy outcomes.320
Additionally, a vertically-integrated private prison industry would be able to defeat the incentives 
built into any particular contract by transferring people in their custody to whichever contract or 
set of contracts offered the most profitable terms—essentially, engaging in arbitrage with human 
bodies. And taken as a whole, the only way for the industry to continue growing would be to 
continue increasing the number of people in its custody—no matter how much individual 
contracts seek to disincentivize that growth. 
In addition to the company’s general interest in continuing each supervisees’ criminal 
justice system involvement, there may be a further incentive for reincarceration instead of merely 
extending the term of supervision. Privatized probation is a low-margin business that depends on 
high volumes of supervisees to turn a profit.321 Assuming that the company exacts the same 
percentage profit from incarceration and supervision, converting a person from an $11/day 
supervision contract to an $84/day incarceration contract322 would yield nearly eight times the net 
revenue. Multiplied across tens of thousands of supervisees, this reincarceration could translate to 
tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars in new annual profits. 
Mass control would thus be only the beginning of the nightmare. Once mass control is 
established and extensively privatized, the imperative to satisfy shareholders through further 
growth will incentivize more incarceration—and thanks to their role in supervision, the private 
prison industry will be able to generate more demand for their incarceration services. 
This second age of mass incarceration would be even more difficult to end than the 
current age of mass incarceration. During the 1980s, private prison companies, prison telephone 
and financial services providers, and other prison profiteers were new players that did not yet 
have a track record of campaign contributions or a sophisticated lobbying presence in Congress 
and state legislatures. They grew organically and developed these capabilities as mass 
incarceration continued to metastasize in the 1990s and early 2000s. This is very different from 
what the situation will be if a second age of mass incarceration emerges from the mass control 
paradigm. In that scenario, the industry will already have strong ties to elected officials and a 
powerful lobbying presence. In addition, as described above, the initial shift from mass 
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incarceration to mass control will set the stage for large-scale prison privatization as mass 
incarceration returns and the demand for prison beds increases. This will create broad reliance on 
the private prison industry by correctional agencies that may have lost the capability to carry out 
these functions in-house—much like the situation ICE finds itself in today. And like ICE today, 
these agencies will likely find it difficult to impose uniform standards, negotiate contracts that 
protect the public interest, and prevent these companies from violating the rights and human 
dignity of those in their custody.323
There would also be new political obstacles to ending the second age of mass 
incarceration that go beyond the new power of private prison companies and other for-profit 
service providers. The return of mass incarceration would sow discord and distrust between 
liberal elites and grassroots organizations like Black Lives Matter, who would correctly blame 
liberal elites for wreaking more havoc on communities of color. And for these liberal elites, 
knowing that decarceration led to a mass control paradigm, which in turn spawned a new prison 
boom, could dampen political will to attempt decarceration a second time. On the conservative 
side, while libertarians could be relied on to continue objecting to high incarceration rates, many 
pro-business, pro-privatization conservatives would be less likely to join any coalition to end the 
new mass incarceration; for them, a large but extensively privatized prison system would actually 
be a desirable result. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Over the past half-decade, the growing left-right alliance to end mass incarceration has 
played a crucial role in opening up a broader national conversation about ending our current 
prison boom. This shared sentencing reform agenda can and should play an important role in 
present and near-term efforts to end the War on Drugs and roll back the extreme, irrational 
sentencing practices that have accumulated over the past three decades, such as mandatory 
minimum sentencing and Three Strikes laws. However, even as we rely on this alliance for certain 
goals, progressives must not mistake these reforms for what is necessary to build a stable 
decarcerated future. 
Decarceration that proceeds according to a conservative worldview will merely shift 
large numbers of people from prison sentences to supervision, without addressing racial justice 
concerns or building the positive social institutions that could enable us to shrink the overall size 
of the carceral state. This will lead to a mass control paradigm characterized by heavy 
privatization of reentry and supervision, further harms to Black and Brown communities, the 
perpetuation of a two-tiered system of justice for rich and poor, and significant incentives to 
further widen the net of criminal justice supervision. 
Mass control will also pave the way for a new and even worse form of mass 
incarceration, because vertically-integrated private prison companies will be able to use their 
reentry and supervision roles to manipulate the mass control paradigm. Merely by changing their 
internal practices, they could rapidly increase demand for prison beds—and then “solve” the 
resulting prison overcrowding by renting new prison bedspace to the government. This second 
prison boom would be more heavily privatized than the first prison boom. Unlike in the 1980s, 
private prison companies would benefit from their now-substantial operating capital, deep 
political connections, preexisting relationships with correctional agencies, and the revolving door 
for public corrections officials. The power of these companies and other factors would make this 
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second age of mass incarceration even more difficult to end than the current one. 
There is a better path. Rather than focusing narrowly on the goal of decarceration and 
shifting people from prisons to punitive forms of supervision, we can chart out an alternative 
future that shrinks the entire carceral state. We can radically rethink who should be incarcerated, 
for how long, in what kind of environment, and for what purposes. We can develop non-punitive 
alternatives to incarceration, and develop strategies for addressing root causes such as poverty, 
substance abuse, and mental illness, and other root causes. We can prioritize racial justice, 
community participation, and human value. Indeed, these ideas are already circulating in Black 
Lives Matter and elsewhere in the grassroots left. Those of us in mainstream progressive 
organizations ought to listen carefully to what they are saying. 
The United States is in a rare political moment where we may be able to begin a real, 
fundamental shift away from the carceral paradigm. We should not squander the opportunity by 
narrowing our horizons in a way that locks us into an even more nightmarish future. 
* * * 
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